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Abstract
This thesis assesses the extent to which historic decision-making tendencies influence contemporary
Philadelphia policy. Philadelphia has a distinctive stock of rowhouses built throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries which today provides more housing units than are needed by the population. The excess
housing stock means that Philadelphia could invest in reuse rather than new construction to meet demand for
affordable rental housing, a path which avoids demolition and displacement in communities which have faced
disinvestment in the past. However, current Philadelphia policy appears to favor new construction of housing.
Using primary and secondary sources, this thesis examines patterns in past housing policy to identify
recurring assumptions among policy-makers. It then uses interviews with housing professionals to identify
case-study policies that influence real estate development: The Ten Year Tax Abatement, zoning, and support
for property maintenance. Finally, it analyzes contemporary decision-maker statements to see whether the
recurring assumptions shape their thinking about these policies. The analysis shows that assumptions do help
explain why some of these policies are in their current form and why changing policy to support housing reuse
has not occurred. However, the analysis also confirms that concrete factors like lack of funding also play a role
in constraining change. This thesis is not an exhaustive overview of Philadelphia housing history or
contemporary policy, and more research is needed to analyze how history impacts other Philadelphia policy
areas or other cities.
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I: Introduction 
As a city’s needs and goals evolve, local policy-makers must decide whether and 
how to update municipal policy. As officials consider changes, several concrete factors 
may shape decisions. Cost or tight municipal finances are common limits on policy 
change; a proposal may not be considered because there are not enough funds to finance 
it without shifting money away from another valued program. Similarly, misalignment 
between federal or state funding and the goals of the proposed municipal program may 
prevent policy change from being feasible.  Political viability also plays a role; if a 
program is unlikely to have broad constituent support, it often does not go forward, 
regardless of its potential effectiveness at solving a problem. Tax increases, for instance, 
are often unviable because they are unpopular, even though they can be effective at 
increasing municipal cash flows. These obstacles are already discussed in policy 
literature, but less frequently-discussed is the role that policy-makers’ underlying 
assumptions play in decision-making.  
This study assesses the extent to which historic decision-making tendencies 
contribute to underlying assumptions among contemporary Philadelphia policy-makers. 
In turn, I analyze how these habit-based beliefs shape current policy compared to the 
more concrete, external factors already recognized by policy literature. I use housing 
reuse in Philadelphia to explore these questions in detail. After identifying decision-
making tendencies in historic Philadelphia housing policy, I will analyze how policy-
makers discuss three contemporary programs, each of which affects whether private 
developers choose to invest in existing housing or new construction. By analyzing policy-
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maker language, I will identify the extent to which these current leaders’ views are 
influenced by values and priorities which have appeared regularly throughout 
Philadelphia’s history relative to how they are influenced by concrete, external 
constraints.  
Introduction to the Case Study: Housing Reuse in Philadelphia  
 Reuse of existing housing stock is an important issue in Philadelphia because 
construction and development decisions have implications for the city’s low-income 
communities, particularly in terms of equity. In an urban planning context, equitable 
actions are those that seek to address past injustices; examples might include making 
planning decisions primarily on the basis of how they would affect historically under-
represented residents or targeting investment to communities that have faced historic 
disinvestment. 1 Equity is currently a buzzword in urban planning which can tend towards 
overuse and being imprecise, but it has value in that its use draws attention to injustices 
in underprivileged communities and can highlight reasons that policies might need to 
change. Indeed, policy-makers and community advocates alike currently consider 
positive impact on under-represented and disinvested communities an important public 
policy litmus test.  
Preservation and reuse of existing housing in low-income communities is more 
equitable than new construction because it is more likely to show respect for the wishes 
                                                 
1 One image, widely circulated online, depicts this concept by showing a group of people of different 
heights standing on boxes; the boxes are stacked differently for each person so that they are all brought to 
the same eye level. 
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and needs of current residents, correcting a history in which such respect was usually not 
shown.2 Unlike blank-slate redevelopment – the demolition of existing structures and 
their replacement with new structures – reuse preserves existing landscapes. The 
preservation of a familiar landscape has been shown to improve economic, social, and 
emotional outcomes for residents. This preservation is also an important form of 
investment in the existing community. Existing housing is also more likely to meet needs 
such as sufficient space for a large family. Blank-slate redevelopment, on the other hand, 
is more likely than reuse to disrupt the security of familiar surroundings, symbolize local 
residents’ lack of power, and be perceived as continued disinvestment in long-time 
residents. In essence, reuse is more likely to address past injustices, and new construction 
is more likely to perpetuate them. Therefore, when evaluated through an equity lens, 
policy-makers have reason to direct resources towards housing reuse rather than new 
construction if possible. 
 Philadelphia has enormous opportunity to invest in rehabilitation of its housing 
stock, largely because of its housing history. In the early nineteenth century, easy access 
to capital through the ground rent system and extension of mortgages by landowners 
allowed Philadelphia builders to construct small rowhouses cheaply and easily. The 
steady wages of the burgeoning industrial economy meant that much of the workforce 
could afford to purchase such homes. The combination of a strong housing market and 
ready access to construction capital and land meant that housing rapidly proliferated, and 
                                                 
2 While equity-based critiques of municipal development policy have gained a new primacy, they build on 
decades of community-centered rhetoric in urban planning. Jane Jacobs, for instance, is a critical figure in 
the development of this lens. 
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over the rest of the century new systems like building societies continued to support 
large-scale housing construction. The resulting large supply of small, affordable houses 
caused Philadelphia to become known as The City of Homes. Deindustrialization and 
movement to the suburbs in the mid-twentieth century finally put an end to Philadelphia’s 
rapid housing construction and left the city with a housing stock much larger than its 
population. Today, the city has a 14% overall vacancy rate.3 However, many of 
Philadelphia’s households continue to live in single-family housing that dates from the 
building boom, with 40% of renters living in rowhouses.4  
Despite the large stock of existing housing, city policies that influence housing 
development have not been able to foster large-scale reinvestment in rehabilitation, 
particularly in units for low-income renters. Instead, housing production has favored new 
construction or luxury-level rehabilitation. While developer decision-making is the result 
of a variety of factors, both policy makers and developers state that policy plays a role in 
whether investment in affordable rehabilitation occurs.  
 At this moment in Philadelphia, policy-makers are starting to consider a change in 
direction for housing policy that could offer more support for existing housing reuse. In 
autumn 2018, the administration of Mayor James Kenney released the city’s first 
dedicated housing plan. The plan, which is even titled “Housing for Equity,” 
acknowledges the city’s ongoing housing problems, particularly for low-income 
                                                 
3 Housing for Equity: An Action Plan for Philadelphia,  (Philadelphia: The Kenney Adminstration and the 
Housing Advisory Board, 2018), 4. 
4 Healthy Rowhouse Project, "Healthy Rowhouse Project: The Housing Challenge" (web page), accessed 
March 15, 2019,  https://healthyrowhouse.org/. 
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residents, and proposes policy changes to better address these issues in future. This 
acknowledgement could open the door for changes to policy that could encourage more 
rehabilitation to create affordable rental units. These changes need not be large; the city 
does not need to add new programs.5 Policy-makers may only need to alter the design and 
function of existing policies.  
As policy-makers consider these changes, they will need to be aware of what 
obstacles they face, and herein lies the value of understanding the role of decision-
making tendencies. While a policy-maker may not be able to change the constraints of 
limited city finances or state policy, she may be able to change her assumptions about 
what policy should strive to achieve. Having such assumptions is not inherently 
problematic, but if their perpetuation is preventing policy change that could be beneficial, 
then addressing those assumptions could be worthwhile. Before one can change habits, 
however, one must understand them, and such a basic understanding is the goal of this 
thesis.  
 In the following essay, I will attempt to trace decision-making tendencies through 
Philadelphia’s housing history and through a set of policies that influence contemporary 
housing development. I first provide an overview of literature on housing reuse and 
general motivations and constraints on housing policy, as well as a survey of 
Philadelphia’s existing housing stock and housing policy environment. This section 
                                                 
5 Examples of new programs include training in construction to work on rehabilitation of existing 
affordably-priced housing (see Christine Negroni, "To Address Affordable Housing Shortage, Restoring 
19th-Century Homes," The New York Times, March 28, 2017.) and strategic demolition (see James R. 
Cohen, "Abandoned Housing: Exploring Lessons from Baltimore," Housing Policy Debate 12, no. 3 
(2001).) 
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includes a more complete history of how Philadelphia’s housing stock developed. I next 
analyze Philadelphia’s history of housing problems and policy responses, noting 
recurring patterns in how policy-makers viewed and addressed housing issues. I consider 
these to be decision-making tendencies. Next, I provide an overview of factors that could 
influence whether developers pursue housing reuse or new construction, choosing three 
potentially influential Philadelphia policies for further analysis. Finally, I analyze the 
language policy-makers use when discussing these policies, particularly focusing on how 
they justify or explain keeping the policies in their current form. Within these 
justifications, I look for assumptions that are rooted in the decision-making tendencies I 
already identified. I also look for the role of external constraints.  
In the context of housing, policy-maker priorities and values informing decision-
making do form visible patterns, and these same tendencies can be traced through how 
policy-makers discuss some contemporary policies. Assumptions rooted in history can 
therefore be seen as having a role in shaping contemporary policy. However, not all 
policies are influenced by such underlying assumptions to the same degree, and more 
concrete factors beyond municipal control such as shortage of funding also influence 
policy-maker decisions and shape policy. While policy change may not be possible 
without overcoming such external limitations, this analysis shows that decision-making 
habits are also important to consider. If policy-makers wish to change the directions of 
current policy, particularly to support more investment in existing housing, they will need 
to take steps to alter these internal decision-making tendencies. 
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Definitions and Project Limits 
Several key phrases appear consistently throughout this essay, and as their use is 
central to my argument, I will briefly define them before moving forward. First, this 
essay considers a policy-maker to be any public official who has responsibility in 
crafting, recommending, or administering policy. This includes not only elected 
legislators like city councilmembers but also heads of executive departments, who shape 
how their departments function even though they do not write city law. In the context of 
this analysis, such departmental choices are considered to contribute to policy. The terms 
city officials or city leaders may also refer to policy-makers. 
Concrete, external limitations are considered to be easily-identified constraints on 
policy that are beyond municipal policy-maker control. By this definition, such 
limitations include a general shortage of city funds even though this is a local issue 
because a local policy-maker cannot easily alter this situation, just as she cannot easily 
alter federal policy. These factors are contrasted with decision-making habits, which are 
internal to local policy-makers and could, in theory, be changed.   
Finally, decision-making tendencies and decision-making habits are used 
interchangeably in this essay to refer to recurring themes in how policy decisions are 
made by city officials. A contemporary policy-maker can be said to be exhibiting a 
decision-making tendency if they make a decision about a current program similar to 
historical decisions about past policy. Often, these tendencies take the form of 
assumptions; policy-makers throughout Philadelphia’s history may consistently assume 
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or believe that a certain issue should be prioritized or a problem should be addressed in a 
particular way.  
It is also important to note some limits on the scope of this project. Within the 
case study, the analysis focuses exclusively on the goal of repurposing housing for 
affordable rental units, not for homeownership, and specifically examines how decision-
making tendencies influence policies that might make this particular reuse less feasible. 
There are several reasons for this decision. First, the need for affordable rental housing is 
more severe than the need for affordable homeownership; renters are regarded as the 
most vulnerable members of low-income communities to displacement and 
homelessness. Additionally, many of Philadelphia’s existing programs to fund housing 
repairs are limited to homeowners. The question of why there is a lack of policies to 
support rehabilitation of rental housing is thus more compelling; indeed, a habit of 
meeting the needs of homeowners over low-income renters proves to be a tendency that 
must be overcome to more effectively serve renters.   
While this study is designed to analyze the influence of history, it does not aim to 
be a comprehensive review of housing issues and housing policy in Philadelphia. The 
history section provides a sample of important moments in Philadelphia’s housing history 
as illustrated by primary and secondary sources. This sample provides a sufficient picture 
of housing at different periods of history to identify tendencies, but it is entirely possible 
that some important housing policy developments are not included in this overview, and 
it should not be used as a definitive resource on the topic.6  
                                                 
6 See bibliography for additional sources on Philadelphia housing history.  
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Similarly, this thesis is not a comprehensive resource on contemporary 
Philadelphia housing policy. While I provide a basic overview of the current housing 
policy environment both as expressed in plans and described by professionals in the field, 
the overview is not a full analysis of all local policies that affect housing development. 
The overview also does not aim to declare whether there is an overall bias towards or 
against reusing existing units or make a definitive statement as to how or why policies 
influence development. However, such an analysis of housing policy culture in 
Philadelphia is warranted in the future given the important implications development has 
for low-income communities.  
Above all, this study demonstrates the relative value of combining historical and 
contemporary analysis of policy. While understanding the influence of underlying 
assumptions rooted in historic tendencies may not remove all obstacles to contemporary 
policy change, there is still value in understanding this relationship. If program cost 
limitations were removed, Philadelphia policy-makers would still need to overcome their 
assumptions about the best methods to deal with housing issues and what policy should 
be trying to achieve if they wanted to change course and start supporting housing reuse to 
a greater degree. This finding has important implications for policy innovation in 
Philadelphia and potentially for all cities.  
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II: Housing Reuse as a Philadelphia Policy Issue 
Equity and Housing Reuse in Existing Literature 
Among academics, there is a clear call to assess policy interventions in low-
income communities by whether they address or perpetuate past under-representation and 
disinvestment.7 This conviction is spread across disciplines from Chaskin, Joseph, and 
Vale in housing policy, to Page and Rypkema in historic preservation, to Fullilove and 
Wallace in psychology.8 All of these authors have analyzed housing policy in these 
equity-based terms; their comparisons of blank-slate redevelopment and use of existing 
housing stock are of particular interest.  
Economists Glaeser, Gyourko, and others argue that unfettered construction of 
new housing serves low-income communities by maximizing housing supply and 
therefore limiting price increases that result from unmet demand. However, the overall 
academic conversation on housing development is critical of new construction replacing 
                                                 
7 Chaskin and Joseph and Vale, in particular, document how policy makers primarily assessed housing 
policy in terms of concentration of poverty and other economic factors in the 1990s. Their own community-
based critiques embody a shift away from purely economic analyses. Robert J. Chaskin and Mark L. 
Joseph, Integrating the Inner City: The Promise and Perils of Mixed-Income Public Housing 
Transformation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 4, 24, 27-9, 217, 25-38; Lawrence J. 
Vale, Purging the Poorest: Public Housing and the Design Politics of Twice-Cleared Communities 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 325, 34.  
8 Max Page, “Comment on James R. Cohen's ‘Abandoned Housing: Exploring Lessons from Baltimore,’” 
Housing Policy Debate 12, no. 3 (2001): 459; Donovan D. Rypkema, Historic Preservation and Affordable 
Housing: The Missed Connection, (Washington, DC: The National Trust for Histroic Preservation, 2002), 
7; Mindy Fullilove, Root Shock: How Tearing up City Neighborhoods Hurts America, and What We Can 
Do About It (New York: New Village Press, 2004), 11-12, 18-19, 121-23; Mindy Thompson Fullilove and 
Rodrick Wallace, “Serial Forced Displacement in American Cities, 1916–2010,” Journal of Urban Health 
88, no. 3 (2011): 384. 
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existing units in low-income communities.9 Fullilove, Wallace, and Rypkema argue that 
blank-slate redevelopment often follows years of disinvestment and perpetuates that 
history by demolishing remaining fabric.10 Vale, Rypkema, and Page expand on this 
theme, arguing that policy-makers often assume that current residents and physical fabric 
must be replaced or supplemented for struggling areas to thrive. Therefore, existing 
characteristics valued by community members are likely to see continued disinvestment 
and replacement.11 New development can also exacerbate power disparities between 
long-time residents and newer, wealthier residents, as new arrivals have more 
institutional power and will shape the community to meet their own needs.12 This 
critique, however, assumes that long-time residents are still in the community; low-
income residents are very likely to be displaced by new construction, even if it is 
affordable housing.13  
                                                 
9 Edward L. Glaeser, "Preservation Follies," City Journal 20, no. 2 (2010); Edward L. Glaeser and Joseph 
Gyourko, Rethinking Federal Housing Policy: How to Make Housing Plentiful and Affordable 
(Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2008), 3-4. 
10 Fullilove and Wallace,  382, 86; Fullilove, 11; Rypkema,  10.  
11 Vale, 31; Rypkema,  6; Page,  461. 
12 Chaskin and Joseph, 39, 31-2, 224. 
13 Displacement is problematic phenomenon for several reasons. First, it separates residents from the social 
structures they rely on. See Fullilove and Wallace,  381, 83. Second, it can lead to housing instability and 
homelessness, as low-income renters can struggle to find affordable homes that meet their needs as well as 
the one they left. See Vale, 35; Vincent Reina and Ben Winter, “Safety Net? The Utility of Vouchers When 
a Place-Based Rental Subsidy Ends” (unpublished work, Philadelphia, PA, 2016); Lance Freeman, “The 
Impact of Source of Income Laws on Voucher Utilization,” Housing Policy Debate 22, no. 2 (2012); Amy 
Bogdon et al., National Analysis of Housing Affordability, Adequacy, and Availability: A Framework for 
Local Housing Strategies, (Washington DC: The Urban Institute for the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, 1993); Erin Mierzwa, Kathryn P. Nelson, and Harriet Newburger, Affordability and 
Availability of Rental Housing in Pennsylvania, (Philadelphia, PA: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
2010); Erin Graves, “Rooms for Improvement: A Qualitative Metasynthesis of the Housing Choice 
Voucher Program,” Housing Policy Debate 26, no. 2 (2016); M. D. Eriksen, “Difficult Development Areas 
and the Supply of Subsidized Housing,” Regional Science and Economics 64 (2017).  
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A host of studies suggest that reusing extant housing can have positive impacts on 
under-privileged communities. Vale and Rypkema point out that existing, historic 
housing is more likely to meet the size needs of large families and be proximate to 
resources crucial to lower-income households, including schools, transportation, 
employment, and social services.14 Preserving existing housing stock for long-time 
residents also preserves familiar landscapes and helps protects existing social networks. 
Fullilove and Wallace argue that these familiar landscapes and networks contribute to a 
sense of rootedness and security which is essential for psychological well-being and both 
social and economic stability.15  
Several authors have already proposed reasons that municipal policy may not 
encourage investment in existing housing, particularly for low-income renters, despite 
these benefits. Some of these factors are concrete limitations imposed on cities by larger 
state and federal policy and financial systems. Both private financing and federal 
affordable housing programs that cities rely on to fund housing investment are designed 
to fund larger apartment buildings rather than individual houses, limiting funding for 
rehabilitation. Urban policy professor Alex Schwartz cites evidence that owners of rental 
properties with five to forty-nine units have far less access to private financing with 
favorable terms than larger properties. Redevelopment is therefore more reliant on public 
                                                 
Leaving the low-income community is unlikely to improve circumstances for low-income residents; in 
Vale’s words, “All too often, the poor have merely shifted the site of their poverty while distancing 
themselves from previous networks of social and emotional support” Vale, 342. 
14 Vale, 31, 339; Rypkema,  4, 8. 
15 Fullilove and Wallace argue that the loss of existing housing stock is an important component in 
furthering social disorder, and the restoration of existing housing reactivates positive social interactions that 
are the basis of healthy communities. Fullilove and Wallace,  386, 88. 
13 
 
funding programs. However, as Garboden and Newman, Listoken et. al, and Page argue, 
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit and even the Historic Tax Credit are likewise 
designed for large multi-family buildings.16  
Cities also rely on private developers to invest in housing. Chaskin and Joseph, 
Vale, and gentrification expert Miriam Zuk all argue that for developers to turn profits 
that keep them in business, a project must have space for more tenants than are currently 
in situ to increase revenues after the expensive construction process. New construction is 
not only able to accommodate more new tenants but is perceived as being more 
successful at marketing to a new group of tenants.17 Within these restrictions, cities 
struggle to prioritize rehabilitation of existing housing without putting forward local 
funding, which can be quite limited. 
However, existing studies also indicate that underlying policy-maker priorities 
influence decision-making in favor of new construction. Throughout the twentieth 
century and into the present, policy makers across American cities defined policy success 
in terms of accumulating capital and encouraging growth, which trumped more 
community-minded goals.18 Demolition serves these goals by wiping out the memory of 
politically-unpopular rundown neighborhoods, and redevelopment replaces these areas 
                                                 
16 Garboden & Newman also point out that there are not enough Housing Choice Vouchers to create 
demand that would make rehab of these smaller buildings viable. Philip M. E. Garboden and Sandra 
Newman, “Is Preserving Small, Low-End Rental Housing Feasible?,” Housing Policy Debate 22, no. 4 
(2012): 507-08. Also see Alex F. Schwartz, Housing Policy in the United States (New York: Routledge, 
2015), 105; David Listokin, Barbara Listokin, and Michael Lahr, “The Contributions of Historic 
Preservation to Housing and Economic Development,” Housing Policy Debate 9, no. 3 (1998): 447; Page, 
460.  
17 Chaskin and Joseph, 217; Vale 23-24; Miriam Zuk et al., Gentrification, Displacement, and the Role of 
Public Investiment: A Literature Review, (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2015), 11.  
18 Zuk et al., 12; Chaskin and Joseph, 218.  
14 
 
with new, more popular housing.19 Changing the landscape provides a completely new 
image to attract new middle-class spenders and residents, increasing city revenue. 
Reducing the visibility of struggling landscapes can also improve the image of cities as a 
whole and increase access to outside capital.20  
Exiting Conditions in Philadelphia Housing 
Philadelphia’s housing stock does not currently meet needs for affordable 
housing. Of households earning less than 30% of area median income, 87% are rent-
burdened, defined as spending more than 30% of their income on housing. To address 
this issue, the city would need an additional 71,000 units affordable and available – on 
the market but not occupied by higher-income residents – to these extremely low-income 
households.21 However, Philadelphia does not lack housing supply. For much of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Philadelphia had a reputation for its rapid 
production of affordable single-family homes on a massive scale. Much of this housing 
survives and makes up most of the city’s existing housing stock – 88% of the 
Philadelphia’s housing was built before 1980 – and has resulted in an abundant 
contemporary housing supply.22  
Historian Donna Rilling’s work on Philadelphia’s early nineteenth-century 
building patterns demonstrates several factors that influenced this housing production. 
                                                 
19 Vale, 24, 30, 316-8; Page, 458-9; Rypkema, 6; Fullilove and Wallace, 382-3; Chaskin and Joseph, 24. 
20 Vale, 316; Chaskin and Joseph, 10; Page, 461.  
21 Vincent Reina and Catherine Droser, Preserving Philadelphia: Developing a Successful Strategy to 
Preserve Existing Subsidized Housing, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2017), 2. 
22 U.S. Census Bureau, 2012-2016 ACS, cited in Housing for Equity: An Action Plan for Philadelphia,  5. 
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One of the most significant is transplantation of English ground rent laws to Philadelphia. 
From the colonial period to their elimination in 1854, these laws allowed landowners to 
grant title to an area of land to another party in perpetuity in exchange for an annual rent. 
The system was popular among Philadelphia landowners because ground rents offered 
higher returns and less long-term uncertainty than other investments. Landowners often 
required ground-renters to build houses on the land, as sale of the houses would 
guarantee ground-rent payments. Landowners could further maximize returns by 
extending mortgages to those who built upon the land.23 
Ground rent meant that early builders could access land and capital for 
housebuilding at little-to-no up-front cost, which lead to the proliferation of the building 
profession. Would-be homebuilders could easily afford to erect a collection of houses, 
provided they were cheap to construct, and sell them for a profit. Two-to-three story 
rowhouses did not require much capital to construct and therefore suited builders’ needs 
perfectly, which resulted in their proliferation. At the same time, the easy access to land 
and capital meant that it was easy to enter the building business, and the profits available 
from rowhouses made the business even more attractive.24  
As more and more men became speculative builders, leasing land and erecting 
housing for sale, housing continued to proliferate in the early nineteenth century, and 
prices remained affordable. The low cost of rowhouse construction and the ground rent 
                                                 
23 Donna J. Rilling, Making Houses, Crafting Capitalism: Builders in Philadelphia, 1790-1850 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 40, 42, 46-47, 50, 51, 61-62. 
24 Upfront costs were further decreased because the ground rent system allowed entrepreneurs to pass the 
annual ground rent on to buyers of the structures they built, as the first rent was usually not due until a year 
after purchase. Rilling, 40.  
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system, which removed the cost of land from the initial purchase price, also decreased 
house prices. In this period, Philadelphia was known for the affordability of its housing 
relative to other cities.25  
At the same time, Philadelphia’s burgeoning industrial economy meant that more 
and more people could afford to purchase a modest home. As Domenic Vitiello 
discusses, Philadelphia manufacturers worked to foster the growth of a powerful 
industrial sector in the early nineteenth century through utilizing personal networks and 
fostering investments in infrastructure. The growth machine built a prosperous new labor 
economy in which many households earned a good living through their wage labor.26 By 
the end of the century, Philadelphia was known for its relative affordability and how easy 
it was to make a living and described as “The best poor man’s country in the world.”27 
The affordability and proliferation of housing continued even after the end of the 
ground rent system in 1854. The continued prosperity of the population helped keep 
building profitable, which kept supply high and prices low. The rising importance of 
building societies, which provided financing to their members, also kept construction 
affordable. Though building societies began in Philadelphia in 1831, they did not become 
significant until the end of the financing benefits of the ground rent system.28 At the end 
of the nineteenth century, the plentiful housing stock had continued to keep both rents 
                                                 
25 Rilling, 40, 51, 52.  
26 Domenic Vitiello, Engineering Philadelphia: The Sellers Family and the Industrial Metropolis (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 5, 7, 10. 
27 Quote from Steven Conn, Metropolitan Philadelphia: Living with the Presence of the Past (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 117. 
28 Donna J. Rilling, “Building Philadelphia: Real Estate Development in the City of Homes, 1790 to 1837” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1993), 53, 71-72. 
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and homeownership relatively affordable; renting was 50% to 75% cheaper in 
Philadelphia than New York.29 Twentieth-century housing advocate Charles Abrams 
discussed the popularity and affordability of the rowhouse in the early twentieth century, 
stating that in that period, houses with modern amenities like hot water and electricity 
could be rented for $8 to $14 per week or bought by someone earning $25 to $40 per 
week.30 
As a result of this proliferation of rowhouses over multiple centuries, Philadelphia 
continues to have a large stock of housing. The city’s industries slowed after World War 
II resulting in the job and population loss common to many older cities in the twentieth 
century, and as a result, that stock of housing is more than is needed by the current 
population.31 As of 2016, Philadelphia had 64,504 units overall, 14% of which are vacant 
                                                 
29 Indeed, New York is an excellent comparison for highlighting how Philadelphia’s characteristics created 
a housing market quite different from other cities. In Steve Conn’s words, “No other large American city 
grew this way, and as a consequence, no other city developed both the physical stock and culture of the 
single-family home” (see Conn, 129). The primary source comparing housing in New York to housing in 
Philadelphia in the period described by Rilling is Elizabeth Blackmar, Manhattan for Rent, 1785-1850 
(Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 7, 8, 9-10, 15, 18, 23, 32, 37, 41, 184, 88-9, 206. While 
Philadelphia landowners prioritized stable, hands-off investments, New York landowners prioritized high 
returns. While Philadelphia landowners opened land to development, landowners in New York recognized 
that they could gain more profit by maintaining tight control on land, especially as land and housing 
became less readily available in the early nineteenth century. Law supported tight control on development; 
unlike in Philadelphia, New York ground rent policies did not grant title in perpetuity, and when the lease 
expired, structures on the land were usually demolished. When building new housing, landowners and other 
investors prioritized housing for higher-income residents. New York’s working people were generally 
considered an “unproductive” market for new housing. The active interest that wealthy owners took in 
housing also meant that luxury housing was feasible; small scale, speculative builders were hired for wages 
and were not funding construction themselves. As a result of all these differences, the stock of housing was 
limited, overall and particularly for working people. Much of the population was pushed into renting space 
in subdivided houses, “paying more and more rent for less and less space.” Also see Rilling, Making 
Houses, Crafting Capitalism: Builders in Philadelphia, 1790-1850, 53.  
30 Charles Abrams and Robert Kolodny, Home Ownership for the Poor: A Program for Philadelphia (New 
York: Praeger Publishers), 85-87. 
31 Vitiello, 193. 
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(fig. 1).32 Philadelphia’s distinctive rowhouses continue to house many of the city’s 
renters, with 40% of renters living in a single-family home. 33 
 
 
Figure 1. Existing Conditions in Philadelphia’s Housing Stock. Of all the units in the total stock, 88% 
were built before 1980, many of those at the turn of the century. Philadelphia’s large historical housing 
stock means that there are more units than can be used by the current population, resulting in an overall 
vacancy rate of 14%. Source: "Housing for Equity: An Action Plan for Philadelphia." 
 
 
Despite the enormous stock of existing small-scale homes, investment in 
Philadelphia has not been targeted to take advantage of these housing units, particularly 
to meet demand for affordable rental housing. As a result, even as investment in housing 
overall has increased, many existing housing units continue in disrepair or are lost from 
the housing stock altogether. Between 2008 and 2016, the city added 6,000 units renting 
                                                 
32 Housing for Equity: An Action Plan for Philadelphia,  4. 
33 Abrams and Kolodny, 85-92; “Healthy Rowhouse Project: The Housing Challenge.” 
64,504
9,031
56,764
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
Total Housing Units Vacant Built Before 1980
H
o
u
si
n
g 
U
n
it
s
19 
 
for at least $2,000 per month. During the same period, the city lost 13,000 units renting 
for at least as little as $800 per month; underinvestment at this end of the market means 
that these units may be abandoned or demolished (fig. 2). Areas like Center City and 
University City have seen rapid investment and increasing prices while outlying areas 
home to more low-income residents and higher vacancy rates continue to struggle with 
poor housing quality and lack of investment.34 Many units continue to lack complete 
facilities; of the city’s total housing stock including vacant units, 31,000 units lack 
complete kitchens, and 27,000 units lack complete plumbing facilities (fig. 3).35 All of 
this lack of investment in existing units for the benefit of low-income renters is 
particularly problematic because new affordable housing construction alone is not 
meeting the need; in 2017, eight projects were approved for Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits in Philad creating 475 additional rent-restricted units, only a fraction of the 
needed 71,000 units.36  
 
 
                                                 
34 Reina and Droser,  13. 
35 Housing for Equity: An Action Plan for Philadelphia,  4-5. 
36 Anna Kramer, "Old Homes, High Poverty Make Philadelphia Housing Less Than Affordable for Some " 
PlanPhilly, July 25, 2018, http://planphilly.com/articles/2018/07/25/old-homes-high-poverty-make-
philadelphia-housing-less-than-affordable-for-some.  
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Figure 2. Relative Change in Philadelphia High-Rent and Low-Rent Housing Units, 2008-2016. 
Despite the potential of Philadelphia’s enormous housing stock to provide low-income housing, the city is 
losing an enormous number of affordable properties. At the same time, most of the new units that are added 
to the housing stock are luxury level and do not ease lack of affordable, quality housing. Source: "Housing 
for Equity: An Action Plan for Philadelphia." 
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Figure 3. Sample of 2017 Condition Problems in Philadelphia Housing. Current reinvestment practices 
in Philadelphia do not appear to be reducing the large number of housing units with condition issues, such 
as lack of complete kitchens. Nearly half of all the city’s units lack complete kitchens. Source: "Housing 
for Equity: An Action Plan for Philadelphia." 
 
Existing Conditions in Philadelphia Housing Policy 
Until 2018, when the Kenney administration released Philadelphia’s first official 
housing plan, the city had not had a dedicated, comprehensive housing policy. Existing 
land use and taxation policies, however, have impacted Philadelphia’s housing by 
influencing developer decisions. The “Housing for Equity” plan addresses these policies, 
proposes some changes to them, and puts forward a few new policies to help the city 
achieve its goals of having housing that meets the needs of all residents. This section 
discusses both the existing policies and some of those proposed in the new plan and 
identifies common themes.  
Other Units Units Without Complete Kitchens
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Current housing policy goals show both a shift towards more social justice-
minded policy and the continuation of a focus on fostering economic growth. The new 
housing plan acknowledges that existing policies have not always benefitted lowest-
income residents, failing to support investment and affordable housing in many 
neighborhoods. New proposals aim to shift the direction of policy to more effectively 
meet housing need for under-privileged residents over the next ten years. The plan aims 
to preserve 6,350 units of existing housing per year to meet housing need as well as add 
vacant units back into the usable housing stock through investment. However, the plan 
also states the hope that new investment will foster needed economic growth for the 
city.37  
In terms of methods, Philadelphia’s housing policies frequently rely on attracting 
private and other sources of funding because the city’s resources are limited. This trend is 
particularly visible in new policy proposals; the new plan has a stated goal of leveraging 
local funds to access private housing financing at a rate of 1:2.38 A new housing 
development fund and backing for construction loans are both designed to make investing 
in housing more feasible and attractive for private lenders. The plan proposes similar 
strategies in new initiatives to preserve existing units, including loan coverage for lenders 
who assist small-scale landlords in rehabilitation efforts.39 While such proposals show the 
willingness of city officials to preserve existing housing, these methods demonstrate how 
financial constraints limit the city’s efforts at more equitable housing policy and 
                                                 
37 Housing for Equity: An Action Plan for Philadelphia,  3-5. 
38 Ibid., 13. 
39 Ibid., 7. 
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necessitate economic growth policies. A report on housing preservation efforts expresses 
skepticism that the city can afford to finance tenant relocation assistance, for instance, 
and the new plan highlights the need for upzoning to increase property tax revenue to 
fund the housing trust fund.40  
Given the need for outside funding and to increase city revenue, both proposed 
and existing policies continue a trend of incentivizing private developers to add new 
housing. The new plan advocates for expanding existing tax abatements, which do not tax 
improvements made to a property, including both rehabilitation and new construction, for 
ten years. While the plan recommends a greater variety of zoning to allow more housing 
types, it also supports continuing the practice of upzoning in areas with strong markets to 
encourage new development in both mixed-income and market-rate housing.41 
A similar trend is that the city’s housing efforts are supplemented by a strong 
nonprofit sector. The report on housing preservation argues that the presence of 
organizations involved in tenant organizing, legal assistance, and technical assistance to 
small landlords is vital to preserving housing in Philadelphia. LISC Philadelphia and the 
Philadelphia Association of CDCs are particularly mentioned as handling these issues 
instead of the public sector.42 
Finally, while the new plan advocates funding for small-scale landlords to help 
maintain properties, many of the city’s longstanding programs regarding maintenance are 
targeted to homeowners. These include Basic Systems Repair, which funds repairs that 
                                                 
40 Reina and Droser, 13; Housing for Equity: An Action Plan for Philadelphia,  9. 
41 Housing for Equity: An Action Plan for Philadelphia,  9, 10, 13. 
42 Reina and Droser, 11.  
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address health and safety or structural issues to income-qualified households, and Restore 
Repair Renew: Philadelphia Neighborhood Home Preservation Loan Program, which 
provides low-interest loans for home repairs for owners earning less than 120% of Area 
Median Income.43 
III: Methodology 
 This section explains my overall methodology for applying a historical lens to 
contemporary policy. The method consisted of identifying historical decision-making 
habits, selecting case-study policies, and analyzing current policy-maker language in 
terms of the identified decision-making tendencies. The first step was to conduct a survey 
of Philadelphia housing and governance history in secondary sources. Based on these 
sources, I identified important moments in Philadelphia’s housing history and studied 
primary sources from these periods. Based on this survey, I identified patterns in the way 
policy-makers reacted to various housing issues over time. I particularly focused on what 
they claimed the problems were, the action (or inaction) pursued in response, and the 
justification provided for the response. Similarities in these areas demonstrated recurring 
priorities and assumptions over time. Some patterns occurred consistently throughout 
Philadelphia’s history regardless of immediate housing context, while others ebb and 
flow in response to particular situations. 
Next, I identified case-study policies to be used in the final analysis, selecting 
policies that were likely to influence whether developers opted to pursue new 
                                                 
43 Housing for Equity: An Action Plan for Philadelphia,  8. 
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construction or invest in existing housing. I chose to base my analysis on interviews 
rather than attempt to measure the influence of policy. This does limit my ability to 
objectively state that the policies I selected are the most likely to affect developer 
choices, but given the focus of this thesis, this limit is not a major concern. The goal of 
this stage of the analysis was not to be able to make a claim about policy impacts on 
development but simply to select three policies to explore further. For this purpose, 
subjective views of professionals involved in housing development were sufficient. 
Measuring the influence of policy on private actions in a data-intensive manner would be 
a project in itself and is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
I spoke to nine professionals who have experience working in Philadelphia and 
provide a variety of expertise and perspectives (table 1). The group includes housing 
developers specializing in reuse of a variety of building sizes, other affordable housing 
professionals, preservation professionals, and policy analysts/government employees. 44 I 
asked each person the same questions regarding whether developers were more likely to 
invest in rehabilitation or blank-slate redevelopment and what policies and other factors 
influenced that decision. After the interviews were completed, I tallied which policies 
were consistently identified as influencing developer decision-making. The three policies 
I selected were also discussed similarly by most interviewees; other policies were 
consistently brought-up, but interviewees disagreed on how they influenced the 
development process.  
                                                 
44 The one prominent absence from the interview group is for-profit developers specializing in new 
construction. Time restrictions prevented this connection, and future analyses should definitely bring this 
perspective into the conversation.  
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Table 1. Interviewees for Identifying Case-Study Policies. 
Name Primary Field or Role in Research 
Kiki Bolender General Housing/Preservation 
Nancy Gephart Small Housing Development 
Arielle Harris Philadelphia Policy 
David Hollenberg Preservation 
Cory Kegerise Preservation 
John Kromer Philadelphia Housing Policy 
Brett Meringoff Large Housing Development 
Dina Schlossberg General Housing 
Ken Weinstein Small Housing Development 
 
 The final phase was to analyze whether the recurring tendencies I identified in 
phase 1 shaped any of the three case-study policies, particularly in a way that kept them 
from changing to better support rehabilitation. To accomplish this, I analyzed language 
used in both legal documents and statements to understand policy-makers perspectives on 
the policies and their goals. If the policy was rooted in a government document such as 
an ordinance, I analyzed its stated goals and functions. I also conducted extensive 
newspaper research to see what policy-makers have said about the policy both at its 
inception and over time. Finally, I filled in any gaps with interviews both with people 
who work in the relevant branches of government. Having assembled a base of language 
used in relation to those policies, I looked for patterns in how officials described their 
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goals and choices and compared them to the policy-maker habits I had already identified. 
This strategy revealed both whether the historical tendencies influenced contemporary 
policy decision-making and how they might specifically shape policies.  
IV: Habits in Housing Policy 
 As we have seen, Philadelphia’s rowhouse-centered private housing market 
provided affordable, quality housing to most of the city’s people for much of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, even during the private building 
boom, issues regarding quality or affordability for low-income renters still arose, and 
commentators documented how policy-makers responded to these concerns. Despite 
changes to the housing development context including the elimination of ground rent, rise 
of building societies, deindustrialization and population loss, increased public regulation, 
and increases in federal funding programs, several consistencies emerge in how policy-
makers have responded to housing problems over time. Others emerge in response to 
particular contexts, such as deindustrialization, but have persisted even as contexts have 
since changed. These habits of decision-making may play a role in contemporary policy-
maker actions.  
Chronology of Housing Issues and Responses 
 The limitations of the private housing market for the lowest-income residents can 
be seen as early as the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1840s, Philadelphia’s public water 
system had made great strides to bring running water to public pumps in most areas of the 
city, and indoor plumbing was included in most new homes. However, retrofits for 
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running water were much less common in houses rented to poorer Philadelphians, and 
city policy-makers had taken no steps to require running water in all living units. In an 
1849 report to the American Medical Association, Philadelphia doctor Isaac Parrish 
called the lack of guaranteed clean water for all households a “great evil” and called out 
the lack of city policy to address this issue. Despite this and other critiques, however, the 
city government did not require running water in all new construction, let alone existing 
housing, until the twentieth century, when running water had already become the 
standard.45 
 The controversy over water policy is an early example of the city government 
struggling to act when called upon to address gaps left by private development activity, 
and this issue became even more prominent at the turn of the century. At the time, the 
private market was still churning out relatively low-cost housing. The public sector 
supported this activity by making development as easy as possible; zoning, for instance, 
was extremely liberal, allowing most residential development to proceed without 
regulation.46 Once again, however, the benefits of private development did not extend to 
everyone. Many of the city’s poor residents were packed into cramped alleys and houses 
subdivided into tenements; W.E.B. DuBois noted that the city’s Black residents lived in 
particularly crowded dwellings, many of which still lacked running water. Though city 
health officials regularly documented these conditions, city policy-makers did not act to 
address them, opting neither to provide funding to fix private housing nor to build new 
                                                 
45 Sam Bass Warner, The Private City; Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 109-10. 
46 Abrams and Kolodny, 91. 
29 
 
housing for low-income people directly.47 Public action remained limited to making 
private building as easy as possible.  
 Private organizations like the Octavia Hill Association stepped in to address the 
city’s rental housing issues. Based on the work of its namesake in Britain, the Octavia 
Hill Association in Philadelphia was a mission-oriented business, seeking to address 
rental housing quality issues in a way that would generate a small return. Recognizing 
that rehabilitating existing housing was more cost-effective and, as they argued, more 
aligned with the spirit of Philadelphia than new construction, the organization bought 
some South Philadelphia homes and renovated them. They also took over management of 
buildings that remained in private ownership to help owners save operating costs, 
reinvesting the funds in upkeep.48 
 The Octavia Hill Association also participated in political advocacy in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Recognizing that landlords would have a bigger 
incentive to keep housing in good condition if cities were required to inspect all housing, 
not just new construction, the organization promoted Pennsylvania state legislation that 
would require municipal inspections of rental properties. The legislation was defeated in 
1905 but passed in 1907 after a successful public awareness campaign. In Philadelphia, 
however, the legislation did not have the desired result; the city struggled to keep up with 
                                                 
47 Samantha G. Driscoll, “Practical Preservation in Philadelphia: The Octavia Hill Association 1896-1912” 
(Master of Science in Historic Preservation thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2011), 2, 6, 24-25; Abrams 
and Kolodny, 88. 
48 Driscoll,  1, 2, 6, 30. 
30 
 
the number of inspections that were required by law, either because of low capacity or 
lack of interest.49  
 The belief that the private sector was the best means of providing quality 
affordable housing persisted among city leaders into the 1920s. Bernard Newman, the 
executive director of the Philadelphia Housing Association, a private organization 
advising on city policy, argued that the private sector had always been able to provide 
sufficient housing at affordable prices via the mechanism of rowhouses, and that success 
made public action and even philanthropy unnecessary. The city should simply clear the 
way to let builders keep building.50  
 Later in the twentieth century, the idea that governments had an interest in 
providing quality housing gained momentum. During the Great Depression, the federal 
government grappled with the fact that many Americans could not afford homes in the 
private market and passed a series of acts that gave the government a role in funding and 
administering affordable housing provision.51 As professor of urban studies Stephanie 
Ryberg discusses, local governments and city planners likewise became more active in 
urban issues from protection of commercial corridors to addressing poor living conditions 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 53-4, 65. 
50 Abrams and Kolodny, 90. 
51 Lawrence J. Vale, From the Puritans to the Projects: Public Housing and Public Neighbors (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 155, 61-3. According to Vale, the major turning points in carving 
out a role for government in housing were the establishment of the Housing Division of the Public Works 
Administration (1933), the Wagner-Steagall Housing Act (1937), defense housing during World War II 
(1940), and the Housing Act of 1949.  
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during the 1940s.52 During this era, conversations about how the local government could 
help provide housing became more common.  
 A prominent early advocate for an active local government in Philadelphia was 
Arthur Binns. Binns was a socially-focused housing investor who, like the Octavia Hill 
Association, recognized that rehabilitating existing housing both improved conditions for 
low-income renters and offered good returns on investment. By the 1940s, Binns had 
personally rehabilitated nearly 1,800 houses in West Philadelphia and Center City. His 
work focused on repairing building systems like roof and windows and adding basic 
conveniences like bathrooms. 53 However, Binns recognized that his personal work, like 
that of Octavia Hill, was limited in scope, and that large-scale rehabilitation efforts would 
need public involvement and investment. In his words, “Private effort alone cannot attack 
and kill the blight in our cities.”  Shortly after the nation’s first federally-funded 
affordable housing program began, Binns proposed a program for Philadelphia that 
would use federal dollars to fund rehabilitation rather than demolition and construction of 
new public housing.54 Philadelphia, however, did not initiate the program because federal 
funding was designed to support only demolition and new construction.55  
 The 1950s and 1960s saw the advent of Philadelphia’s most direct efforts at local 
housing policy to date, ushered in by both changes in federal funding policy and radical 
                                                 
52 Stephanie R. Ryberg, "Historic Preservation's Urban Renewal Roots: Preservation and Planning in 
Midcentury Philadelphia," Journal of Urban History 39, no. 2 (2012): 196. 
53 Unknown author, unknown article of Urban Land (1941 or 1942): 5-7. Excerpt provided by Daniel 
Bluestone.  
54 Ibid. 
55 Abrams and Kolodny, 85. 
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changes in the city’s needs. The housing stock had fallen into increased disrepair since 
the Great Depression.56 After World War II, Philadelphia also faced rapid 
deindustrialization, job loss, and out-migration. Between 1957 and 1964, the city lost 
101,400 jobs.57 The rise of the automobile simultaneously prompted out-migration to the 
suburbs.58 These factors combined into increased vacancy and lack of investment in 
Philadelphia’s housing stock. At the same time, the American Housing Act of 1949 
provided federal funding for slum clearance, known as urban renewal, and the 
construction of public housing. The new funding source prompted unprecedented public 
intervention in housing, focused on demolition and new construction.  
However, local leaders in the Philadelphia City Planning Commission (PCPC) 
and the Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA) became concerned that the methods 
supported by the 1949 Act were encouraging flight of wealthier households to the 
suburbs and resulting in concentration of low-income Black households in the city. 
Policy makers such as Housing Coordinator William Rafsky proposed an alternative, 
Philadelphia-specific housing strategy focused on scattered-site housing projects. Policy-
makers also recognized that rehabilitation would be more cost-effective than widespread 
demolition. However, as had occurred when Binns made his proposal, the lack of federal 
funding for such a project hindered its initial progress.59 Private developers and financers 
were hesitant to invest in rehabilitation in run-down areas without such a targeted federal 
                                                 
56 Ryberg,  197. 
57 John F. Bauman, “Row Housing as Public Housing: The Philadelphia Story, 1957-2013,” The 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 138, no. 4 (2014): 427. 
58 Conn, 13, 15. 
59 Bauman,  430, 32, 40; Abrams and Kolodny, 85; Ryberg,  201. 
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program; these neighborhoods were perceived as risky, resulting in lack of financing and 
insurance coverage. As Abrams noted in the 1960s, banks did not want rundown 
buildings as collateral, and even the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was only 
interested in insuring loans on low-risk properties.60 
 In 1954, the Housing and Urban Renewal Act updated urban renewal policies to 
provide federal funding for rehabilitation as well as new construction and demolition, 
making a policy shift in Philadelphia feasible, and the shift was well-supported in both 
the public and private sectors.61 Within three years, Philadelphia’s Joint Committee on 
Public Housing Policy conducted an analysis of the city’s current policies and proposed 
shifting the city’s focus to rehabilitating existing housing because it would better serve 
the poor Black population and was more cost-effective.62 Both policy-makers and private 
actors supported the Joint Committee on Public Housing Policy’s plan. Rehabilitation of 
scattered sites was more palatable to Philadelphia’s higher-income residents than new 
construction of public housing. The Chamber of Commerce, Home Builders Association, 
and private developers also supported the plan because it relied on the private sector for 
new construction. Mayor Dilworth gave his support, and the Philadelphia Housing 
Authority began purchasing properties, contracting with private developers to renovate 
them, and then renting them as public housing. The program grew as the city continued to 
                                                 
60 Abrams and Kolodny, 93, 95. 
61 For a holistic narrative of Philadelphia city planning in the 1940s and 1950s and its relationship to reuse, 
see Stephanie R. Ryberg, "Historic Preservation's Urban Renewal Roots: Preservation and Planning in 
Midcentury Philadelphia," Journal of Urban History 39, no. 2 (2012). 
62 Bauman,  430-1, 32, 41, 42. 
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lose population and vacancy increased, and the Philadelphia Housing Development 
Corporation was created to purchase and hold properties for rehabilitation.63  
The program successfully renovated thousands of houses and put them to use, but 
it faltered in the long-term. The development coordinator at the Mayor’s office expressed 
concern when the program expanded into primarily white areas, fearing that new public 
housing units would push current residents to the suburbs. Relying on private developers 
also proved problematic when the private need for a profit margin conflicted with public 
fair wages and fixed sale prices to the housing authority. Finally, federal funding proved 
a limitation. As with other contemporary public housing projects throughout the country, 
the program did not include long-term maintenance funding from the federal government, 
and many of the properties degraded over time. The general scale of abandonment and 
vandalism in Philadelphia also grew too great for the program to handle without 
additional federal dollars. Six-thousand reused housing units were still part of 
Philadelphia Housing Authority’s portfolio as of 2009, but a quarter of them were 
deteriorating and empty, and the Authority planned to divest of all such units.64 
Recurring Habits in How Policy Makers View and Respond to Problems 
 Several patterns stand out across all these policy decisions in the face of housing 
problems. Some decision-making rationales and policy-maker values appear throughout 
the history discussed, and others only appear after important moments such as the 
population loss of the mid-twentieth century. From the nineteenth-century onward, 
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64 Ibid., 443-4, 36, 47, 50, 55. 
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policy-makers have exhibited belief that private sector builders and developers will 
provide good-quality affordable housing of their own accord. Bernard Newman’s 1920s 
comment that builders should be left to their own devices to provide housing as cheaply 
as possible is a case in point.65 Even Abrams, writing in the 1960s, shows admiration for 
how private developers historically met housing needs, lauding turn-of-the-century 
zoning which made development easy.66 The Philadelphia Housing Authority’s 
willingness to collaborate with private developers for its rehabilitation program rather 
than manage the work itself, as it did with new public housing construction, could be 
seen as a logical outgrowth of this habitual faith in the private sector.  
 Such a conviction was natural in the rowhouse period when private development 
did keep housing much more affordable and in higher condition than cities like New 
York. However, as we have seen, relying on private development did not always address 
all the city’s housing issues, particularly for low-income renters. Local policy-makers 
have also been habitually reluctant to intervene in private sector actions, either fill in the 
gap left by private actors or require private developers to close such gaps. The American 
Medical Association report on access to clean water and subsequent inaction by the city 
is an early example of this pattern; the failure to follow 1907 state law and inspect living 
conditions in rental properties is a later one. The 1950s role of the Chamber of Commerce 
and the Home Builder’s Association in shifting the city away from new public housing 
construction and towards rehabilitation marks a contemporary version of this tendency; 
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policy-makers are more comfortable taking action on housing issues, but private 
development interests still have a role in determining what that action should look like, 
showing a new form of deference.  
 After the city began to lose population, we can see an increasing tendency among 
policy-makers to cater to the wishes of private residents in addition to private developers, 
particularly homeowners and white residents. The importance of citizen reactions to 
policy decisions appears repeatedly in discussions of public housing policy at the time. 
The 1950s rehabilitation proposal was an unapologetic way of making public housing 
more palatable to white residents. The Mayor’s office intervention after the plan was 
enacted to express concern about how white residents of a particular neighborhood would 
react to the housing authority purchasing properties there is further evidence of this 
pattern. As Ryberg discusses, the city planning commission’s famous effort to use 
preservation to appeal to middle-and upper class residents during urban renewal of in 
Society Hill in the late 1950s and 1960s, essentially ousting low-income residents, is 
another famous example.67 These actions appear to have been rooted in the fear that 
valuable private taxpayers would leave the city if their wishes were not respected and if 
plans did not appeal to their tastes.  
 A related habit that appeared in the 1950s is a consistent focus on cost-
effectiveness and increasing city revenue when making policy decisions. Indeed, the need 
to preserve tax base was a primary reason that the city reevaluated its early urban renewal 
                                                 
67 Ryberg,  204. 
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demolition and new construction of public housing towers.68 The argument that the 
rehabilitation plan was much more likely to appeal to current residents and preserve the 
city’s tax base was an important factor in proceeding with the plan, showing the 
underlying significance of city revenue in decision-making. The 1950s argument that 
rehabilitation was cheaper than new construction demonstrates a similar focus on 
conserving city resources.   
 These tendencies are all related to what policy-makers assumed to be valuable 
policy goals or intelligent courses of action over time, even as the immediate contexts of 
housing issues changed. However, another consistent pattern across Philadelphia’s 
housing policy history is that context can pose concrete constraints on what action policy-
makers are able to take. Specifically, factors beyond municipal control such as federal 
policy and private financing preferences can prevent a proposed policy from being 
feasible. Binns’ 1940s proposal was an early victim of this pattern; lack of municipal 
funds or a federal program to support large-scale rehabilitation was the primary reason 
cited for his plan not going forward. Abrams’ 1960s comment that that private financing 
did not support reinvestment in lower-income areas and that federal programs funding 
broad-scale rehabilitation were limited makes a similar point about external constraints. 
Before the Housing and Urban Renewal Act of 1954, Philadelphia had absolutely no 
funding for rehabilitation, and even that program’s limits, like lack of funding for 
maintenance, caused problems because the city could not make up for that deficit. These 
                                                 
68 Bauman,  430. 
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very real instances of the curtailment of housing policy because of funding restrictions 
reiterate the impact of circumstances beyond history and habit on policy decisions.  
V: Policies that Influence Reuse Decisions 
Several underlying tendencies have appeared in Philadelphia policy-maker 
decisions since the nineteenth century, and these same patterns shape contemporary 
policies that are considered to influence whether developers invest in existing housing. 
Before discussing these case-study policies in detail, it is useful to give a brief overview 
of factors that influence the development process according to this project’s interviewees. 
The interviews highlighted multiple non-policy influences such as the need to show 
profit, limits of financing, and the desire to reduce risk, and these decision-making lay the 
groundwork for the influence of policy on decision-making. The case-study policies 
exacerbate other circumstances to push developers towards new construction rather than 
investment in existing housing.69  
One of the first questions asked in interviews was whether, given an empty block 
of existing Philadelphia rowhouses, rehabilitation or replacement with new construction 
is more likely. While preservation professionals and one housing professional felt that 
new construction is generally more likely, developer and policy-focused respondents felt 
that the decision depends on a variety of factors. According to the interviewees, 
developers make most decisions based on how a project’s finances are affected. Most 
developers will seek to maximize profit, at the very least to ensure that the project is 
                                                 
69 All evidence in this section comes from interviews with the people listed in Table 1 in the Methodology 
section unless otherwise noted.  
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financially viable. The focus on generating good returns is exacerbated by Philadelphia’s 
high construction costs and landowner desires to sell land for the highest price that the 
market will support. Location has an impact on how much money a project can make 
because in Philadelphia land prices and how much people will pay for housing vary 
widely by neighborhood. This potential difference in both project cost and profit has an 
impact on whether developers pursue rehabilitation or new construction because, as 
interviewees across fields noted, building new tends to cost more than rehabilitation 
(depending on the scale of work) but people will pay more for newer housing. Therefore, 
new construction is more likely in hot neighborhoods where land prices are highest but 
where people will pay a premium for new housing. Conversely, rehabilitation is more 
likely in neighborhoods where housing prices cannot make up for the cost of construction 
and there are not high land prices to overcome.   
In addition to finances and, by extension, location, interviewees emphasized that 
expertise can push a developer towards either new construction or rehab; most developers 
focus exclusively on one or the other. Developers may also be more comfortable or suited 
to working in neighborhoods where either new construction or rehabilitation is more 
financially feasible. Shift Capital, based in the Kensington neighborhood of Philadelphia, 
is rooted in a place and used to dealing with the challenges of a disinvested community. 
Their work focuses primarily on rehabilitation because it is more feasible in this 
neighborhood. Other developers may be less comfortable working in this kind of 
environment.  
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While these factors can push a developer towards either new construction or 
rehabilitation, interviewees across fields also noted factors that generally make new 
construction more attractive or more feasible than refurbishment. As the literature 
indicated, limitations of federal and private financing are a major factor, especially for 
the creation of affordable housing. Reuse developers Nancy Gephart and Ken Weinstein 
both reiterated the limited applicability of federal financing and incentives like the 
Historic Tax Credit for smaller properties. In addition, Ms. Gephart and housing lawyer 
Dina Schlossberg noted that acquiring private financing for existing properties may be 
difficult if the value of the existing asset is low, as is often the case with older housing. 
Private investors may also be wary of investing in rehabilitation, according to historic 
preservation professor and advocate David Hollenberg. Part of the reason for wariness 
among private financers and investors is that rehab is seen as complex and unpredictable; 
half of the interviewees stated that rehabilitation is seen as prone to unforeseen 
complications and costs.  
Poor condition exacerbates funder and developer nervousness about 
rehabilitation, and unfortunately, as discussed in Section II, poor condition is an ongoing 
concern for Philadelphia’s existing housing. Long-term population loss and widespread 
poverty have limited owner’s money for maintenance, and many houses in Philadelphia 
are dilapidated or abandoned. According to developer Brett Meringoff and Philadelphia 
housing policy expert John Kromer, condition is a primary factor for even rehabilitation-
focused developers in deciding whether to take on a project. Developers assess the 
building for immediate costs, including structural, safety, and environmental concerns, as 
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well as the potential cost of systems like heating and electric over time. Even a 
rehabilitation-focused development organization like Shift Capital will tear down and 
replace a building if condition problems are severe. However, interviewees in both 
development and preservation fields acknowledge that condition can influence decisions 
on the basis of perception as much as on hard costs.  
These non-policy aspects of decision-making highlight areas in which policy may 
influence whether housing is rehabilitated. Policies affecting project cost, profit margin, 
project complexity, and existing building condition are most likely to influence whether 
developers opt to reinvest in a rehabilitation property. While interviewees raised a range 
of policies, three stood out for their relationship to these aspects of developer decision-
making – Philadelphia’s Ten Year Property Tax Abatement, zoning, and support for 
maintenance of existing properties. Sometimes the policies clearly make new 
construction easier or more profitable than rehabilitation, as is the case with the tax 
abatement and zoning, and sometimes they unintentionally create a preference by failing 
to make rehabilitation more attractive to developers. According to interviewees, zoning 
and maintenance programs both fall into this latter category because they struggle to 
sufficiently improve housing condition or allow creative, more profitable redevelopment 
projects. After providing more background on each of the policies I am using as case-
studies, I will make the case that knowledge of tendencies in historic decision-making 
helps explain why these particular policies persist in their current form, a situation that 
may have implications for investment in existing housing.  
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Ten‐Year Tax Abatement 
Philadelphia’s Ten-Year Tax Abatement program is actually composed of 
multiple abatement policies and ordinances; the most relevant of these to housing are 
Rehab Construction for Residential Properties (Ordinance 961) and New Construction for 
Residential Properties (Ordinance 1456-A).70 Under these abatements, an owner’s 
property taxes are reduced by the value of any major improvements he or she makes to a 
property for a period of ten years, beginning with completion of construction.71 Property 
owners still pay taxes on the value of the land and any pre-existing structures.72  
The Rehab Construction for Residential Properties abatement began in 1974 and 
has been substantially amended since, most notably in 2000. As it currently stands, the 
abatement is quite permissive and can be applied to any improvement of an existing 
residential structure that changes the value of the property.73 The original policy was 
more restrictive, focused on addressing serious safety concerns.74 The New Construction 
for Residential Properties abatement, enacted in 2000, applies to any-sized property 
                                                 
70 City of Philadelphia, "Abatements" (web page), Office of Property Assessment, accessed March 25, 
2019, https://www.phila.gov/OPA/AbatementsExemptions/Pages/Abatements.aspx. 
71 Kevin C. Gillen, Philadelphia's Ten-Year Property Tax Abatement: Update Statistics on the Size and 
Distribution of Tax-Abated Properties in Philadelphia, (Philadelphia, PA: Fels Institute of Government, 
University of Pennsylvania, 2013), 2. 
72 Mike Dunn, "City Releases Study of 10-Year Property Tax Abatement," news release, Philadelphia, PA, 
May 24, 2018. 
73 As determined by the Office of Property Assessment upon completion of construction. Rehab 
Construction for Residential Properties, Application for the Exemption of Real Estate Taxes Due to 
Improvements, (Philadelphia, PA: City of Philadelphia Office of Property Assessment, 2015). 
74 The original $10,000 cap on tax exemptions has also been removed. Amending Title 19 of the 
Philadelphia Code, Relating to Finance, Taxes and Collections, by Adding a New Section Authorizing the 
Board of Revision of Taxes, on Behalf of the City of Philadelphia, to Exempt, from Real Estate Taxes, 
Improvements to Residential Property, under Certain Terms and Conditions, Bill no. 961, Council of the 
City of Philadelphia; Philadelphia, PA Municipal Code, § 19-1303 (2); Gillen, 3.  
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where the structure is entirely new, even if there was previously a structure on the site.75 
This abatement’s original goal was addressing population losses that occurred in the 
1990s.76  
Both the residential abatements can be used on any property throughout the city. 
At the time of enactment, City Council made the intentional decision to apply the 
abatement unilaterally, arguing that investment was needed throughout the city. Policy-
makers used a 1945 Pennsylvania guideline for determining blighted areas and a 1967 
law for determining impoverished areas to guide this determination.77 Because the 
abatement is meant to respond to areas in need, it could theoretically be confined to some 
areas of the city; however, Council has never retargeted the abatement. 
Though the two programs have similar specifications, they have radically 
different benefits in practice. Since the abatement only covers the value of improvements, 
in the case of rehabilitation, the owner may still be paying taxes on the pre-existing 
structure in addition to taxes on the land while receiving the abatement. With new 
construction, however, the owner usually pays taxes only on the land, regardless of 
whether there was a prior structure, because the entire new building is an improvement.78 
                                                 
75 Gillen,  2, 4. 
76 New Construction for Residential Properties, Application for the Exemption of Real Estate Taxes Due to 
Improvements, (Philadelphia, PA: City of Philadelphia Office of Property Assessment, 2015); Nathan 
Gorenstein, "City Waives Tax to Lure New Homes the 10-Year Abatement Applies to Construction, Which 
Is Rare in Philadelphia. Renovators Also Benefit," The Philadelphia Inquirer, December 29, 2000, 
NewsBank. 
77 Bill no. 961; Philadelphia, PA Municipal Code, § 19-1303 (4).  
78 "Abatements". 
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Relationship to Reuse of Existing Housing 
The abatements appear to have successfully spurred general investment in 
housing.79 They have particularly favored luxury-level housing, new construction, and 
construction in specific, high-value neighborhoods. Data published in 2018 shows that 
59% of owner tax benefits from the abatement programs is tied to properties in just 6% of 
all Philadelphia neighborhoods, particularly Graduate Hospital, Rittenhouse Square, 
Northern Liberties, Point Breeze, and Fishtown. In contrast, abatements do not appear to 
have made development attractive in less profitable areas outside Greater Center City, 
where rents remain low and costs of construction remain high.80 Tax benefits are also 
concentrated among luxury-level properties; the fifteen properties with the highest abated 
property values constitute 0.1% of properties receiving the abatement but make up 16% 
of value of abated properties city-wide.81 In contrast, only 5% of abated properties are 
owned by affordable housing developers.82 Finally, the abatement programs have 
incentivized new construction. After the New Construction abatement went into effect, 
new construction increased 263%.83 While new construction has only a slight advantage 
                                                 
79 During the 2009 to 2011 recession, housing starts in Philadelphia increased by 64%; in suburbs just 
beyond Philadelphia that lack such an abatement, housing starts declined. Gillen,  6. 
80 An Analysis of Tax Abatements in Philadelphia,  (Philadelphia, PA: Office of the Controller, City of 
Philadelphia, 2018), 16, 21, 25. 
81 The prevalence of luxury housing is particularly strong in Center City, where most abatements are close 
to $1 million; the average abatement city-wide is $250,000. Ibid., v, vi. 
82 Gillen, 22, 24.  
83 Gillen,  1; Richard Sarkis, "Now Is the Time to Buy Vacant Land in Philadelphia," Philadelphia Business 
Journal, August 27, 2018, https://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2018/08/27/cre-data-reonomy-
why-buy-philly-vacant-land-bank.html. 
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over rehab, constituting 53% of abated properties, new construction properties tend to be 
bigger and higher-value, receiving an outsize share of abatement benefit.84 
The interview process shed some tentative light on why the abatements might 
incentivize new construction more than rehabilitation. Almost every interviewee noted 
that the ten-year tax abatement programs favor new construction over rehabilitation. 
Because the tax abatement is based on value added to a property, developers in 
Philadelphia have an incentive to pick projects where they will do a substantial amount of 
work, like new construction. In turn, developers continue to work in neighborhoods 
where people will pay for new construction, raising prices to cover the higher 
construction costs. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the inadequacy of the abatement 
to make investing in outlying, low-rent areas or low-rent properties like rowhouses 
profitable, especially compared with the opportunity for profit under the abatement in 
central locations.85 
General Responses to the Abatement Programs 
 The abatements’ noticeable impacts on development have caused a more 
prominent public debate than either of the two other case-study policies. While some of 
the public argues that the abatements spur necessary investment, much of the public 
reaction in the 2010s has been negative. Critics argue that the program does not benefit 
people fairy because its use for luxury housing in high-cost neighborhoods benefits the 
wealthy and developers more than Philadelphians with fewer resources. Indeed, some 
                                                 
84 Dunn; An Analysis of Tax Abatements in Philadelphia,  21. 
85 An Analysis of Tax Abatements in Philadelphia,  25, 27. 
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argue that luxury new construction raises neighboring property taxes while large 
developers and owners of new buildings pay no taxes.86 Commentators therefore argue 
that the abatements sacrifice vital funding for the city and its schools while generating 
little public benefit.87  
 As a result of these critiques, policy-makers have begun discussing possible 
changes to the abatement programs, and several reports have been published assessing 
the current programs, their results, and the potential effects of proposed changes. 
Acknowledging that the city is a more positive environment for real estate investment 
today than when the abatements were introduced, the alternatives include eliminating the 
abatement, limiting its term, capping values, or limiting the abatement to specific areas of 
the city.88 The current discussion of these proposals provides an opportunity to assess 
what factors are influencing policy-maker decisions on the abatement.  
Zoning 
Zoning affects what kind of development is allowed in different areas of the city 
and includes both zoning code and zoning maps, which are both put into effect by city 
council, though often separately. The policy focuses on managing the appearance and use 
of development; the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspection describes the 
city’s zoning as regulating land use, building height and size, population density, and 
                                                 
86 Gillen,  2; An Analysis of Tax Abatements in Philadelphia, 2; Reity O'Brien, "Ten Arrested at Occupy 
Philly Sit-in at Comcast," The Philadelphia Inquirer, November 3, 2011, NewsBank. 
87 An Analysis of Tax Abatements in Philadelphia,  2. 
88 Another option is gradually decreasing the value of the tax abatement received by each property over the 
course of ten years.  
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character of development for the general good of the city.89 Developers of a property 
must demonstrate to Licenses and Inspection that the project follows the rules assigned to 
that property by the city’s zoning code and zoning maps before the project can be 
approved. If a project wants permission to do something that is not explicitly allowed on 
a property by the city’s zoning, a developer may go to the Zoning Board of Adjustments 
to seek approval. For a variance, which offers even more relief from the zoning code, city 
council must weigh in.90 
Both Philadelphia’s zoning code and several zoning maps have been updated in 
the past ten years; the current zoning code dates to 2011. Mandated by a city-wide vote in 
2007, this was the first comprehensive update to the city’s zoning code since 1963. Over 
the intervening fifty years, the zoning code was changed in a piecemeal way, adding new 
rules and overlays to different areas of the city bit by bit without removing older rules.91 
This process created a very complex zoning code. As such, while the update includes the 
standard goal of promoting “public health, safety, and general welfare” of both citizens 
and visitors to Philadelphia, its primary aim was to reduce the prior code’s complexity. 92 
The 2011 legislation completely repealed the prior zoning rules and replaced it with the 
new code, which went into effect in August 2012.93 
                                                 
89 City of Philadelphia, "Zoning" (web page), Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspection, 
accessed March 30, 2019, https://www.phila.gov/li/pages/zoning.aspx. 
90 Philadelphia, PA Municipal Code § 14-103.  
91 Philadelphia, PA Municipal Code § 14-101.  
92 The former code had become so complex that 40% of projects in the city had to seek a variance from the 
code just to go forward. Philadelphia Code § 14-101; Troy Graham, "Zoning Reform to Face Final Vote - If 
Approved Dec. 15, It Could Increase Local Development by Speeding Philadelphia's Permitting Process," 
The Philadelphia Inquirer, December 8, 2011, NewsBank. 
93 An Ordinance Repealing Title 14 of the Philadelphia Code, Entitled “Zoning and Planning,” and 
Replacing It with a New Title 14 of the Philadelphia Code, Entitled “Zoning and Planning”; and Making 
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However, the zoning chapter of the Philadelphia Code lays out a variety of goals 
beyond reducing complexity, which must be briefly discussed as a background for 
exploring policy-maker decision rationales. The goals fall into four categories: sound 
planning, sustainability, growth and economic development, and fair and consistent 
procedures. The economic development and consistent procedures sections speak to 
reducing complexity and, significantly, focus on how reducing complexity makes 
development easier. One of the sub-goals in this category reads, “removing barriers to 
enable responsible development to proceed ‘as of right’ [without special permissions].” 
The sound planning, sustainability, and economic development sections are much less 
focused on development, instead seeking to strike a balance between growth and 
maintaining local character. The section includes sub-goals such as increasing 
development around transit, focusing investment in deteriorating neighborhoods, and 
keeping “desirable characteristics” of neighborhoods.94 
The 2011 legislation provides a comprehensive update to zoning goals and rules, 
but the process did not include an update to all the city’s zoning maps, which specify 
what types of development are allowed in different parts of the city. The Philadelphia 
City Planning Commission developed recommendations for new zoning maps based on 
lengthy public input and planning processes, but those recommendations needed to be 
                                                 
Conforming Changes to the Zoning Maps of the City; All under Certain Terms and Conditions, Bill no. 
110845, City of Philadelphia, 2011. 
94 Ibid. 
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adopted by city council to take effect.95 Philadelphia’s tradition of Councilmanic 
Prerogative, in which individual councilmembers are allowed to unilaterally make land 
use decisions for their districts, meant that it fell to each councilmember to introduce 
zoning map legislation for his or her district based on the Planning Commission’s 
recommendations.96 Not all of the councilmembers did, however, and other 
councilmembers would not take up the legislation.97 Five years after the update to the 
zoning code, only half of the city had been remapped, mostly in the greater Center City 
area.98 
Relationship to Reuse of Existing Housing 
The interviewees indicated two ways in which Philadelphia’s zoning might 
influence developer decisions to favor new construction. The first is when zoning in an 
area allows for bigger buildings than what is currently there. All preservationists and 
some policy sources made the point that where zoning allows a developer to replace an 
existing house with a bigger structure that can yield more rent, they are likely to do so. In 
these areas, developers can maximize cash flows from a larger building while also 
                                                 
95 Jake Blumgart, "Five Years into Remapping Process, City Council Has yet to Rezone Half of the City," 
PlanPhilly, July 20, 2017, http://planphilly.com/articles/2017/07/20/five-years-into-remapping-process-
city-council-has-yet-to-rezone-half-of-the-city. 
96 The Pew Charitable Trusts, "Philadelphia's Councilmanic Prerogative: How It Works and Why It 
Matters" (web page), accessed April 25, 2019, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/reports/2015/07/philadelphias-councilmanic-prerogative-how-it-works-and-why-it-matters. 
97 Jake Blumgart, "Bill to Ban New 3-Story Homes in Point Breeze, Grays Ferry Introduced by Councilman 
Johnson " PlanPhilly, November 2, 2018, http://planphilly.com/articles/2018/11/02/bill-to-ban-new-3-
story-homes-in-point-breeze-grays-ferry-introduced-by-councilman-johnson. 
98 Blumgart, "Five Years into Remapping Process, City Council Has yet to Rezone Half of the City"; Inga 
Saffron, "Changing Skyline: Proposed Remapping of Center City Land Use Covers Much Needed 
Ground," The Philadelphia Inquirer, March 15, 2013, NewsBank. 
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minimizing cost of permitting, as they would not have to seek a zoning variance to build 
a bigger structure. The phenomenon of zoning at odds with current structures can be seen 
in Philadelphia’s hotter markets, like Graduate Hospital or Brewerytown.  
On the other hand, developers working in rehab of existing homes pointed out that 
zoning may not be permissive enough to maximize profitability and therefore feasibility. 
Ken Weinstein and Nancy Gephart both stated that while single-family zoning prevents 
replacement with larger structures, it can ban subdividing houses into more units. The 
ability to add more units, and therefore more rental income, can be key to paying for the 
expenses of rehab work.  
Support for Maintenance of Existing Housing 
The third case study, support for maintenance of existing properties, is unlike the 
previous two examples in that does not stem from a single public act or section of code. 
Instead, there are many programs that cover maintenance, including the Department of 
Licenses and Inspection’s (L&I) maintenance code enforcement and the Division of 
Housing and Community Development’s (DHCD) and Philadelphia Redevelopment 
Authority’s (PRA) maintenance funding. Because these programs all have a role in 
whether and how housing is maintained, they are considered together for the purpose of 
this thesis, though they are administered separately.  
The Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspection performs a wide range 
of duties related to construction and buildings for the city. In addition to administering 
violations of the Property Maintenance Code, L&I oversees a variety of building and 
construction codes including building code, fire code, plumbing code, electrical code, and 
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others.99 Accordingly, the department handles all construction approvals and permits in 
Philadelphia. L&I also approves licenses such as Rental Licenses, which are required of 
all landlords in the city, and is responsible for monitoring licensed properties to make 
sure they meet maintenance and other requirements.100 
For the purposes of this analysis, administration of property maintenance code is 
one of L&I’s most significant responsibilities. Philadelphia’s Property Maintenance Code 
is the adopted International Property Maintenance Code, which Philadelphia adopted to 
“ensure public health, safety, and welfare insofar as they are affected by the continued 
occupancy of structures and premises.” L&I is responsible for ensuring that the city’s 
residential structures are safe for habitation, and the primary tool for fulfilling this 
responsibility is issuing citations requiring non-compliant residences to meet code or face 
pecuniary consequences. As stated in the code, L&I must ensure that “existing structures 
and premises that do not comply with these provisions shall be altered or repaired to 
provide a minimum level of health and safety.”101 
While L&I focuses on enforcing maintenance through citations, the DHCD’s and 
PRA’s programs are designed to ease the financial burden of property maintenance 
through grants, loans, and some technical assistance. These programs are a response to 
the city’s poverty and general lack of available funds for maintenance, even among 
                                                 
99 City of Philadelphia, "Codes" (web page), Department of Licesnes & Inspection, accessed April 2, 2019, 
https://www.phila.gov/li/codesandregulations/Pages/codes.aspx. 
100 City of Philadelphia, "Find a License or Permit" (web page), Business Services, accessed April 2, 2019, 
https://business.phila.gov/get-licenses-permits/?_ga=1.149040118.156915740.1442254213. 
101 Philadelphia, PA Municipal Code, PM-101.3: Intent.  
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homeowners. According to DHCD, the programs are designed to keep people in their 
current homes and thereby prevent homelessness.102 
The Basic Systems Repair Program, administered by DHCD, is one of the older 
and better-known maintenance funding programs. The program funds emergency repairs 
that affect building habitability, including boiler and heating repairs, structural work, or 
roof replacement. The program also connects applicants to pre-approved contractors. The 
program does not fund cosmetic, amenity, or preventative work; the issues must be 
severe. A qualifying roof problem, for instance, must be collapse of at least four square-
feet of ceiling or roof. Applicants must also fit strict eligibility requirements. They must 
own and live in a single-family home and own no other residential property. They must 
also be up to date on property taxes and water bills and not have received Basic Systems 
Repair Funds in the past three years.103 Finally, applicants must meet strict income 
requirements; the maximum allowed income for a family of four is $36,650.104 
The Restore Repair Renew loan program, created in 2018 and also administered 
by DHCD, is a more flexible funding source that can be used by households with higher 
incomes and be used for preventative maintenance or adding amenities. The program, 
also known as the Housing Preservation Loan Program, offers up to $24,999 in loans for 
work done by a licensed contractor.105 While the maximum allowed income is much 
                                                 
102 City of Philadelphia, "Home Repair" (web page), Division of Housing and Community Development, 
accessed April 1, 2019, http://ohcdphila.org/home-repair/. 
103 City of Philadelphia, "Basic Systems Repair Program" (web page), Division of Housing and Community 
Development, accessed April 1, 2019, http://ohcdphila.org/home-repair/bsrp/. 
104 Kramer. 
105 Caitlin McCabe, "Hope for Low-Income Residents - Philadelphia's Housing Preservation Loan Program 
Will Help Homeowners with Repairs.," The Philadelphia Inquirer, January 21, 2018, NewsBank; "Loans 
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higher than Basic Systems Repair –$104,880 for a family of four – and applicants only 
need a credit score of 580 to apply, there are still some application restrictions; the 
program is again only available to homeowners.106 
Only one Philadelphia program currently offers maintenance funding to landlords, 
a pilot program launched in 2018. The program uses money from the Pennsylvania 
Housing Finance Agency to insure loans that private lenders make to Philadelphia’s 
small-scale landlords. The landlords must own four or fewer units, and the renters must 
not earn more than 100% of Area Median Income.107 Loans can cover any property 
maintenance activity and can be for values up to $25,000.108 The city is still rolling out 
the program and identifying private-sector lenders to administer loans.  
Relationship to Reuse of Existing Housing 
The interview process demonstrated that maintenance and condition of existing 
housing units is a major factor in developer decision-making; a building in worse 
condition is less likely to be seen as a viable rehabilitation project. However, 
maintenance continues to be a widespread problem in Philadelphia despite existing city 
programs, and weaknesses in those programs may prevent them from fully addressing the 
city’s condition concerns. In the case of the funding programs, there may not be enough 
                                                 
for City’s Aging Housing Stock - Old Houses Will Get New Attention under a Program That Will Take 
Even People with Low Credit Scores," The Philadelphia Inquirer, March 17, 2019, NewsBank. 
106 McCabe, "Loans for City’s Aging Housing Stock - Old Houses Will Get New Attention under a 
Program That Will Take Even People with Low Credit Scores." 
107 "Small Landlord Loan Program," news release, Philadelphia, PA, September 3, 2018, 
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108 Aaron Moselle, "New Loans for Home Repair May Be Lifeline for Philly ‘Small Landlords’ — and 
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funding for preventative maintenance to prevent homes from falling into further 
disrepair; Basic Systems repair is targeted to severe problems and cannot be used to 
prevent a small leak from becoming a bigger issue. Even the Restore, Repair, Renew loan 
program, which is less restrictive than Basic Systems Repair, can still only be used for 
approved condition problems. In the case of PRA’s landlord loan pilot program, there is 
no guarantee that landlords will be incentivized to take on loan payments, even at a 
discounted rate, to perform preventative maintenance. Of even greater concern is that the 
funds available through these programs have historically been insufficient to keep up 
with demand for maintenance assistance. Interviewees stated that the wait for Basic 
Systems Repair funds can be several years long, allowing problems to worsen and 
making rehab less feasible as residents wait. Finally, programs to fund maintenance have, 
until recently, focused on homeowners. While offering funds to homeowners is not 
problematic in itself, it is a concern given the focus of this thesis on preserving and 
creating affordable units for renters. As a result of lack of funding, rental properties may 
continue to fall into worse condition and become targeted for demolition in the future.  
Critics also argue that the L&I’s code enforcement is insufficient to address 
widespread maintenance problems. Philadelphia sees certain benefits from L&I’s 
administration of the Property Maintenance Code; according to a 2015 editorial in The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, the city saw property value increases and tax delinquency 
decreases when the department targeted vacant properties for maintenance code 
violations.109 Other sources, however, note that L&I does not take enough action to fully 
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address issues under its purview and prevent problems from getting worse. An opinion 
writer for WHYY argued that the department targets specific types of violations in 
response to tragedy. The Department only cracked down on unlicensed rental properties 
after a fire claimed lives and only increased oversight of fire code maintenance after a 
young man died on a fire escape collapse. According to this observer, these incidents 
demonstrate that “the property code enforcement system is broken.”110 Interviewees also 
noted that the Department focuses heavily on monitoring buildings that are in danger of 
collapse and spends less time monitoring less-severe maintenance violations, creating a 
lack of focus on prevention similar to the funding programs. Even within the imminently-
dangerous properties L&I focuses on, the department does not put resources into 
supporting existing structures. Instead of placing money into hiring a contractor to fix 
problems and placing a lien on the property, L&I often hires a demolition company.  
VI: Analysis of Policy-Maker Language  
 The language used to describe the three policies, both in policy-maker statements 
and in legal documents themselves, gives an indication of the factors that influence how 
policy-makers feel about the policies. The tendencies discussed in Section IV appear in 
language for the case studies, though to different degrees. Policy-maker thoughts on 
zoning appear most related to habitual assumptions with very little decision-making 
influenced by external factors. Support for maintenance offers a contrasting case in which 
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decision-making is most influenced by concrete factors beyond municipal control, such 
as lack of funding and local government capacity. The tax abatements show a 
combination of the two types of factors. Together, the case studies demonstrate that 
assumptions based in historic habits play a role in policy-maker decisions, though to 
varying degrees.  
Role of Assumptions in the Ten‐Year Tax Abatement 
 Language used by policy-makers when discussing the tax abatements connects 
prominently to three assumptions: that the city must rely on private development to meet 
various needs, that the government should support rather than hinder private 
development, and that policy should prioritize generating revenue. The former two 
assumptions are rooted in the nineteenth century, and the latter is traceable to the mid-
twentieth century. Policy-maker statements demonstrate their hope that the tax abatement 
will encourage developers to take action that will produce benefits for the city. 
Councilwoman Janie Blackwell has stated, “I’m for poor people and poor neighborhoods 
getting this abatement… I’m for us trying to lure developers into working in more bad 
areas,” demonstrating a belief that the abatement policy can foster private development 
activity that will benefit the public.111 Her statement implies that private development is 
essential for benefits to arrive in low-income areas. Other policy-makers stress the 
importance of private development to fostering job growth. A report on the abatements 
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and the impact of alternatives from the city’s Finance Department demonstrates how 
important job creation through development is to policy-makers; impact on employment 
growth is one of the primary metrics for evaluating the alternatives.112 
The continued influence of a nineteenth-century assumption is particularly 
apparent because the overall housing context has changed. In the nineteenth century and 
into the early twentieth, Philadelphia was a prosperous manufacturing hub; most people’s 
needs for employment were readily met. As Rilling demonstrates, the primary good 
provided by house builders was affordable, quality housing, and leaders’ stated reliance 
on developers reflected that focus (see Section II). Bernard Newman’s 1920s argument 
that builders should be allowed to act without government intervention focuses 
exclusively on the argument that developers were the best at providing housing (see 
Section IV). Post-industrial Philadelphia, as we have seen, is a place with lower 
population, employment, and investment than at the height of the industrial era, and 
policy-makers have simply adapted Newman’s argument to make the case that private 
development is most likely to solve lack of investment and low employment as well as 
provide housing.  
The argument that the tax abatement is important because it makes development 
easier is also closely connected to past decision-making tendencies. The assumption that 
the government should be making development simpler can be seen in many of the 
program’s officially-stated goals. Indeed, a report by the city’s Controller’s office states 
that a primary goal of the program is to “support developers and spur development more 
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broadly in Philadelphia.” The Office of Property Assessments home web page for the 
abatements describes reducing development costs as one of the major program goals.113 
Regardless of what policy-makers specifically hope development will achieve for 
Philadelphia, the method of keeping barriers for private builders low remains a constant. 
This contemporary thought-process is comparable to historic decisions and assumptions 
including Philadelphia’s unwillingness to require running water in all properties in order 
to avoid restrictions on developers and Abrams’ 1960s statement applauding permissive 
zoning (see Section IV).   
Finally, policy-maker language also shows a priority placed upon generating 
revenue. Even though the abatements forgo some tax revenue in the short term, one the 
most prevalent goals for the policy is that by attracting investment, it will generate 
property value increases that will increase revenue after the abatements end. Frank Rizzo, 
former mayor, was one of the first policy-makers to express the hope that abatements 
would make money for the city, stating that he hoped to attract “all the people that have 
got all the money in this country. I’m going to invite them to Philadelphia. I’m going to 
put packages together that are so attractive that they won’t be able to say no… I’m going 
to offer them tax abatement[s].”114 Today, the official alternatives to the abatements were 
assessed by the Finance Department in terms of how they impact revenue, and the 
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department advocated keeping the current abatements solely because they lead to the 
most property tax revenue long-term.115  
Even policy-makers’ argument that the tax abatement supports homeownership is 
supported by an underlying assumption about the importance of revenue. At the time that 
the New Construction abatement was created, Councilman Frank DiCicco argued that the 
abatement would spur the development of housing that potential new residents would 
want to buy.116 Today, one of the major stated goals of the abatements on the Abatements 
city web page is creating and protecting opportunities for homeownership. The desire to 
increase city revenue by supporting the tax base could be seen in the 1950s when policy-
makers like William Rafsky designed scattered-site public housing in an attempt to stop 
flight of higher-income homeowners to the suburbs. This pattern continued when the 
Dilworth administration attempted to shape the Philadelphia Housing Authority’s 
programs to make them less visible to homeowners (see Section IV). Today, the city is 
more focused on attracting than preserving tax base with the tax abatements, but the 
focus on revenue remains constant.  
These assumptions come together to shape the tax abatement and make changing 
the policy difficult, even as members of the public have complained that it has failed to 
promote investment in all areas of the city and unequally benefits luxury housing and 
new construction. Councilmembers have relied on these assumptions when opposing 
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changes to the abatements that would address critics’ concerns. In 2018, councilmembers 
debated a tax that parties receiving the abatement would pay on construction. Described 
as a tax on the abatement, the proposal was meant to address the perceived unfairness of 
the program and generate some money for the city’s Housing Trust Fund. Councilman 
Alan Domb was one of the parties who opposed the proposal, and his argument hinged on 
prioritizing revenue. He argued that the new tax should not be pursued because it would 
result in lost income for the city.117 The proposal eventually stalled, and at this writing, 
the abatement continues in much the same form that it has since 2000.  
Despite the role of historically-rooted assumptions in contemporary decision-
making, more concrete factors also play a role in shaping the tax abatement. Though 
Philadelphia policy-makers have a tendency to prioritize revenue, the city’s tight finances 
are a real constraint on changing the tax abatement because trying to shift how money is 
spent often means taking money away from some other priority. In the case of the tax 
abatement, much of the public debate has focused on how to best generate money for 
schools, as property taxes are one of the school district’s primary sources of funding, and 
55% of property tax revenue forgone under the abatement would have gone towards 
public education.118 As discussed earlier in this section, reports by the city and the 
University of Pennsylvania have found that keeping the abatement in its current form 
leads to the largest property tax benefits for schools in the long-run. However, policy-
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makers have also expressed concern about lack of funding for the Housing Trust Fund, 
which provides money for affordable housing. Councilman Domb proposed a gradual 
reduction of the abatements to send more property tax dollars to the trust fund.119 That 
proposal, however, has come up against the need to generate funds for public education 
in most official city reports; the city’s limited financial resources mean that policy-
makers have had to choose one goal over another.  
Overall, structural limitations and historical habits both play roles in how policy-
makers regard the tax abatement and general resistance to changing it despite public 
pressure. If policy-makers were motivated to focus the benefits of the abetment into 
outlying areas and modest repairs that could serve low-income renters, thereby reducing 
the abatement offered, they would need to develop a strategy to either overcome or 
appease the assumptions that private development should take a lead in addressing the 
city’s problems, that the city should make private development easier, and that the most 
important concern for the city government is generating revenue.  
Role of Assumptions in Zoning 
 Unlike the tax abatement, there is not a broad public debate on the merits of the 
zoning code and less of a general call to change policy, so assumptions do not figure in 
shaping a debate. However, assumptions played a crucial role in shaping the zoning code 
and the remapping process, and of the three case-study policies, zoning is most connected 
to historic tendencies. Indeed, policy-maker thoughts on the development of this policy 
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are defined by the conflict between two assumptions: that the government should support 
rather than hinder development and that policy-makers should cater to the wishes of 
homeowners. Zoning policies that benefit development are not always perceived 
positively by homeowners and vice-versa; caught between habits of catering to both these 
interests, attempts to improve zoning policy often lead to impasse.   
 As discussed in Section IV, a simple early-twentieth-century zoning code that 
made development easy was lauded through mid-century, and the 2011 zoning update 
demonstrates a continued tendency to desire an easy-to-use code for the sake of 
development. Several policy-makers explicitly critiqued the 1960s zoning code because it 
had begun to make private development difficult. In 2011, Alan Greenberger, the Deputy 
Mayor for Economic Development who chaired the zoning update commission, stated 
that the older zoning code did not “support a predictable development process.” This, he 
argued, prevented the city from being attractive to development.120 Mayor Michael Nutter 
made a similar argument that the older code prevented developers from building in 
Philadelphia because of its complexity.121 Newspaper reports show that the public echoed 
this belief; many believed that councilmembers had too much ability to block 
development because so many projects under the old code required variances.122  
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By comparison, the new code was explicitly designed to not only simplify the 
zoning process for developers but to allow more high-rise development by-right, meaning 
that developers would not need special permission to build, especially in Center City.123 
Policy-makers argued that these changes would make development attractive, again 
showing the tendency of supporting the private sector. Councilman Bill Green promised 
to be an advocate for a zoning code that would encourage development, and Councilman 
Frank DiCicco stated, “I think this is going to be a huge step in continuing to move the 
city of Philadelphia forward.”124 These arguments demonstrate the underlying policy-
maker assumption that simplifying development is good Philadelphia policy and will 
generate benefits for the city.  
 This assumption is connected to patterns of policy-maker behavior that can be 
traced to the mid-nineteenth century, appearing in the city’s reluctance to regulate 
running water in buildings in the 1840s or perform mandatory inspections of rental 
properties in the early 1900s (see Section IV). This continued tendency is even more 
striking as the expected base level of regulation has changed throughout Philadelphia’s 
history. As noted earlier in this essay, Philadelphia policy-makers were expected to take 
on a more active role in housing in the mid-twentieth century. Zoning itself is the mark of 
a stronger regulatory environment than existed in the nineteenth century. Even in this 
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more heavily-regulated context, however, policy-makers still strive towards the light-
handed model of Philadelphia’s early housing history.  
One of the ways in which policy-makers have catered to developers since the 
general increase in regulation is allowing developers a say in what government action 
looks like, and this tendency also appears in the zoning context. As discussed in Section 
IV, private interests weighed-in to support scattered-site public housing in the 1950s 
because it relied on partnership with private builders. While the 2011 zoning code was 
being crafted, developers actively argued that the older code made Philadelphia’s 
development process too unpredictable to be attractive, and that Philadelphia would never 
be able to compete with other cities for development dollars until the process was 
simplified.125 In contrast, they argued that the new zoning code would make the city more 
attractive to development interests.126 This lobbying likely played a role in shaping the 
final policy and policy-maker views, continuing the mid-century tendency. 
 Statements about the zoning code also reveal the assumption that clearing the way 
for development would allow private actors to bring benefits to the city, just as Abrams 
argued that a simplified zoning code would be necessary to produce more housing in the 
1960s. Simplifying the building process was a major part of Mayor Nutter’s 2007 
campaign platform because he felt that private development was vital to overall economic 
prosperity.127 His feelings on the subject were made clear at a 2012 press conference 
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unveiling the new zoning code, where he stated that the new code would “make it easier 
for developers to get projects moving and create jobs.”128 Fostering private development 
was also seen as crucial to helping the city transition to a new “eds and meds”-based 
economy and moving the city out of a prolonged real-estate bust.129 This logic is very 
similar to what could be seen in the tax abatement, where the tendency to believe that 
private development is the best conduit for new housing had morphed into a belief that 
private development was the best conduit for general economic development.130 
 As clearly as policy-maker statements show an assumption that simplifying 
development is good for Philadelphia, other policy-maker statements show an equally 
strong belief policy must cater to homeowners. The combination of these two tendencies 
create a conflict at the heart of Philadelphia zoning policy. If supporting private 
development led to upzoning and policies that allow large-scale development as-of-right, 
catering to homeowners leads to protection of single-family zoning, which limits options 
for new investment.   
 The ongoing argument over how communal housing should be treated by zoning 
law reveals the influence of the assumed need for homeowner support. In Philadelphia, 
almost no neighborhoods outside Center City and University City permit housing with 
individually-rented rooms and communal kitchens and bathrooms, a common method of 
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increasing rental income from a single-family home. Current Licenses and Inspection 
commissioner Dave Perri argues that the zoning code should allow this style of housing 
in areas of the city that are currently zoned single-family, a designation which forbids this 
type of subdivision. His reasoning is that this type of housing is affordable, and discussed 
in Section II, Philadelphia needs affordable housing. As a result of this demand, many of 
these subdivisions happen illegally, and Perri’s concern is that illegal housing units are 
difficult to track and monitor for safety.131 
 However, homeowners across the city are opposed to such a plan, and because 
many policy-makers assume they should prioritize homeowner concerns, zoning 
continues to block communal housing.132 As journalist Jake Blumgart notes, 
“[Homeowner] interests tend to be much better represented in City Hall than poor 
renters.” Councilmembers generally avoid the topic of communal housing conversions, 
and the Zoning Board of Adjustments rarely grants permission for them in single-family 
homes. Gary Jastrzab, the former head of the Planning Commission, feels that Perri’s 
proposal is unlikely to go forward because of these homeowner constraints.133 Even Perri 
can be seen capitulating to such pressure within his proposal. He was careful to include 
ways to mitigate the perceived damage of communal housing in single-family 
neighborhoods. In his words, “I firmly believe we could put rooming houses into 
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traditional residential single-family blocks and that type of more transient use can be 
fully absorbed without negative impact… But if you put ten of them on a block then 
you’ve changed the character of the block.”134 In the face of homeowner preference, there 
is only so much even the most ambitious policy-makers can do.  
 The perceived need to cater to homeowners among policy-makers has even been 
strong enough to challenge the desire to make the development process simpler for 
developers. The momentum of the zoning code update was slowed on several occasions 
by homeowner interests; shortly after the new code went into effect, a Council Bill 
reverted the code back to restricting the types of businesses that were allowed in 
neighborhood commercial corridors because of resident concerns. Councilman Green 
expressed concern that the bill would impede goals of easy approvals and job creation, 
but the bill passed anyway.135 
 The best case of conflicts between catering to development interests and catering 
to homeowners shaping policy is creation of new zoning maps. Some councilmembers 
have been reluctant to pass the zoning maps that reflect the new code; while the new 
maps would simplify the development process, they would reduce councilmember 
control over development and ability of constituent homeowners to push back against 
projects. Councilman Kenyatta Johnson had been reluctant to remap because he felt the 
more complex approvals process allowed greater resident input on new development. 
Rather than remap, he introduced a 2018 overlay that would allow dense development 
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along Point Breeze Avenue and prevent building higher-density housing in the largely 
two-story residential areas. Local residents were pleased with the restrictions on building 
heights, fearing increased property taxes from new development, but opposed the upzone 
on Point Breeze Avenue. Developers, on the other hand, were pleased with the upzone 
because it would make building there more profitable and were dissatisfied with the 
height restrictions in residential areas because it kept development from being profitable. 
Caught between trying to please two interests, Johnson chose a compromise, and neither 
party was fully satisfied.136  
 These examples show policy-makers making decisions about policy based on how 
they expect homeowners will react, demonstrating an underlying assumption that 
homeowners’ wishes must be prioritized. This tendency reaches back to the scattered-site 
housing development of the 1950s. Though ostensibly designed to cost-effectively meet 
need for affordable rental housing, that project was originally designed because policy-
makers felt that the public housing towers funded by the American Housing Act of 1949 
were not palatable to homeowners (see Section IV). Later, the program was reevaluated 
and slowed because of the concern that homeowners would not like the public sector 
buying so many properties for affordable housing, even though housing need was still 
acute. Slowing the project also required placing homeowner interests above development 
interests, as the private sector did most of the scattered-site development work. There is a 
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clear tendency to prioritize homeowners above other interests, particularly low-income 
renters but even above development.  
 The overarching influence of these historic tendencies on policy-makers is the 
creation of impasse. As the Councilman Johnson case illustrates, even after a 
development-friendly zoning code is passed, homeowner interests may keep 
councilmembers from unlocking the potential of the new code to generate revenue for 
property owners or even rehabilitation developers with remapping. Inaction and impasse 
are themselves common themes in Philadelphia policy history; at the time the zoning 
code was passed, Alan Greenberger expressed delight that the council had been able to 
accomplish such an ambitious goal and stated that many people in the city thought they 
would never be able to pass such large legislation.137 The tendency towards impasse 
could easily be considered a concrete limitation on the policy-making process like lack of 
funding or human capacity. However, the zoning case demonstrates that impasse can 
actually be the result of underlying assumptions, and unlike absolute lack of funds, local 
policy-makers could potentially overcome impasse if they were able to come to terms 
with their decision-making habits.  
 In general, external constraints on policy change are far less evident in zoning 
than in the case of the tax abatements. However, the city’s lack of finances still has 
played a role in decreasing the momentum of policy change. Though zoning changes may 
not require major outlays of funding which might have gone to meet some other city 
need, City Council may need to put legislation like zoning on hold to address pressing 
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budget concerns. In 2011, the Council was forced to move its self-imposed deadline for 
updating zoning several times when their attention was diverted by the need to address 
the City’s budget and funding for schools.138 It is unclear whether these issues would 
have been less pressing in a more affluent city, but we can at the very least say they have 
the potential to derail policy change in Philadelphia.  
Role of Assumptions in Support for Existing Maintenance 
 Support for maintenance offers a counter-point to the other two case-study 
policies, where historical decision-making tendencies prominently influenced the shape 
of contemporary policy. While some language used by policy-makers to discuss property 
maintenance does reference these tendencies, factors beyond municipal control play a 
much larger role in how policy-makers talk about L&I and maintenance funding 
programs. In particular, lack of funding and low department capacity limit how policy-
makers can address these programs’ shortcomings. 
 Historic assumptions only notably influence policy-maker discussions of 
maintenance funding; there are slight connections to the tendency to cater to homeowners 
visible in the design of these programs. As we have seen, most funding programs are 
designed exclusively for homeowners, even though, as a housing expert at Drexel’s 
Lindy Institute for Urban Innovation states, renters are in a more “precarious” position 
than homeowners in Philadelphia. Still, when policy-makers discuss housing programs, 
they tend to focus on benefits for homeowners. When Alan Greenberger talks about 
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Philadelphia programs that can defend against displacement and housing instability, he 
cites the funding programs that benefit homeowners.139 Councilmembers Darrell L. 
Clarke and Cherelle Parker have decried the city’s problem with housing condition but 
have also put the problem in terms of homeownership, tracing the problem to the 
struggles of low-income homeowners to access loans.140 In this case, the assumption that 
the city should focus on homeowners may be more rooted in Philadelphia’s early identity 
as a place where most people could afford to own a home, as Rilling discusses (see 
Section II), rather than the need to preserve homeowners as tax base that surfaced in the 
1950s. However, the willingness to prioritize homeowner needs over the needs of lower-
income renters holds true to mid-century, when the scattered-site affordable housing 
program was shaped around homeowners more than the program’s tenants (see Section 
IV). 
 However, the primary reasons given by policy-makers that the funding programs 
are limited and that L&I does not effectively regulate property maintenance is that the 
programs have limited capacity and funding. Multiple policy-makers have stated that lack 
of human capacity is problematic for L&I’s monitoring of property maintenance. L&I has 
been described as “troubled” by newspaper reports and other city officials throughout the 
2010s. In 2015, architectural reporter Inga Saffron noted that L&I was “perpetually 
understaffed;” in the same year, an advisory commission aiming to address the 
department’s shortcomings noted that the department had too many responsibilities for its 
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staff levels.141 Several policy-makers advocated increasing hiring at L&I, particularly 
after a deadly collapse at an under-regulated construction site in 2013. City Council 
advocated adding more inspectors to the department, and a 2015 report from the 
Controller’s Office advocated increasing the number of inspectors from 56 to 136 so that 
the Department could do more inspections from the street.142 However, little action has 
been taken after the release of such reports to put plans of action into effect; after the 
2013 report, for instance, City Council stated that they were planning to introduce 
legislation to address hiring, but no timeline was given.143 
 Statements also show the argument that L&I is limited because it is perpetually 
under-funded. An editorial in The Philadelphia Inquirer stated that investing in L&I 
should be a simple decision because the Department keeps the public safe and lifts 
property values.144 Similarly, the former city controller Alan Butkovitz stated that 
properly funding protection of life and safety should be a top city priority. However, as 
with staffing, the city has struggled to take action to fund L&I. Butkovitz expressed 
pessimism that the city would allocate funds to the Department, stating that it would have 
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to fight for every penny in a city with tight finances.145 An excellent example of this 
phenomenon was the Nutter Administration’s 2015 funding proposals. A report from the 
Nutter Administration stated that L&I needed $13.9 million in new funding to hire 83 
new employees.146 However, the final funding package included only $10.8 million over 
three years for L&I, which would only be enough to fund 43 new employees in 2016.147 
As has been discussed, funding in Philadelphia is highly contested and tight, which might 
contribute to the struggle to fund L&I even in the midst of severe critiques. For instance, 
when Nutter proposed increasing property taxes to fund the city’s schools, mayoral 
candidates argued that he should cut new spending, including for L&I, rather than raise 
taxes.148 
 The new Commissioner of L&I, Dave Perri, exemplifies how the concrete 
constraints at L&I are the primary forces shaping policy. Since 2016, Perri has made a 
visible effort to increase L&I’s capacity. He re-evaluated responsibility allocation and 
found enough hiring funds to plan for 24 new safety inspectors in 2017. Perri also fought 
to convince the city that $2.5 million appropriated to IT projects in other departments 
should be given to L&I so that they could streamline permitting processes and spend 
more time on inspections. However, even the commissioner motivated to improve the 
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department acknowledges that within current constraints, real change at L&I is going to 
take some time.149 
 The result of L&I’s constraints on policy is that department leaders have to 
prioritize its responsibilities, and understandably, policy-makers choose to focus on the 
most severe safety concerns more than preventative maintenance. This focus is notably 
more the result of concrete constraints than underlying assumption. L&I officials describe 
resident safety as the Department’s preeminent responsibility, and it is certainly a major 
goal for Dave Perri; in increasing the department’s efficiency, Perri aims to “shift the 
focus back to life safety,” not to “make developers happy,” a significant break with the 
tendency to cater to private development in policy-maker language.150 Policy-makers in 
other areas of the city share a similar view of L&I’s responsibilities. The Nutter 
administration’s report was titled “L&I 2015 Plan for a Safer City,” and City Council’s 
2013 report stated that its primary goal was to address department issues that jeopardize 
safety.151 
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they are not doing enough on this front. In the wake of the 2013 collapse at a construction site, L&I shifted 
its attention to monitoring construction violations. In 2015, however, The Philadelphia Inquirer issued a 
report critiquing the department for ignoring dangerous and unsafe buildings to monitor construction. The 
same year, Butkovitz argued that the commissioner for L&I – Perri’s predecessor – should step down for 
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 Because of L&I’s struggle to work intently on more than one type of code 
violation at a time and the pressure to focus on public safety, the department focuses on 
eliminating imminently dangerous buildings rather than monitoring and ensuring 
maintenance that could prevent more buildings from becoming unsafe. According to an 
interviewee who was a former L&I employee, the department lacks the capacity to 
monitor all condition concerns in Philadelphia, and the department usually relies on 
citizen passersby to report potential safety concerns. As a result, many of the reports that 
the department gets and issues violations for are pre-selected to problems that most 
people would recognize as dangerous. Many employees are resistant to doing proactive 
inspections that could catch issues before they become imminently dangerous because the 
department is already stretched thin.152  
 Lack of funding also dictates how L&I handles the violations it does pursue. In 
handling unsafe and imminently dangerous properties, the department focuses on 
demolition rather than repair. If an L&I inspector claimed a property could be saved and 
the building later injured someone, it would create a liability L&I cannot afford. The 
process of hiring a contractor to do repairs is also more time consuming than demolition, 
and while repairs may be less expensive as a starting point, they could easily balloon if 
new problems are found.  
 Policy-maker language also shows that the reach of the city’s maintenance 
programs is dictated and limited by funding restrictions, and these may combine with 
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assumptions about prioritizing homeowners to shape the limited, ownership-focused 
maintenance programs that exist. In 2003, the Secretary of Housing and Neighborhood 
Preservation, Kevin R. Hanna, stated that the need for Basic Systems Repair was huge, 
but they simply did not have the funds to expand the program.153 Federal funding might 
be able to address this issue, but this has also been lacking. Two years after Hanna’s 
comment, Deborah McColloch, the Director of the Office of Housing and Community 
Development, stated that federal funding cuts made expanding Basic Systems Repair 
nearly impossible even as the city increased local funding for the program.154  
Policy-makers have attempted to shore up maintenance programs with local 
funding, showing a desire to address the problem, but the efforts have been insufficient. 
Councilmembers Clarke and Parker introduced a $100 million bond to fund Restore 
Repair Renew, which addressed some of Basic System Repair’s limitations by expanding 
income eligibility, but $60 million of that bond issue had to go towards addressing the 
Basic Systems Repair backlog that had resulted from lack of funding.155 The programs 
again suffer from the tightness of funding in Philadelphia; more money for one program 
often means taking some away from another. The city introduced a Targeted Basic 
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Systems Repair Program for middle-income neighborhoods in 2003, but this program 
also had to take money away from other development programs.156  
The support for property maintenance policy area thus offers an important 
counterpoint to the other case-studies. Here, we see that though historic tendencies might 
play a small role in shaping policy, external limitations have a much larger influence. 
This case-study therefore shows the potential limits of historic habits in explaining 
contemporary policy; at the very least, it demonstrates that it does not play an important 
role in shaping all Philadelphia housing policy. 
VII: Conclusion 
 Commentators frequently point to how cost, federal policy, and other external 
limitations can concretely influence policy-maker decisions. However, few have explored 
whether underlying decision-making habits can less visibly influence decisions and shape 
policy. In this thesis, I explored whether such tendencies exist in Philadelphia’s historic 
housing policy and whether they generate assumptions that influence contemporary 
decision-making. The primary goal was to determine whether these underlying 
assumptions challenge leaders’ ability to change policy to help it support low-income 
renters and the reuse of existing housing.   
 Exploring three case-study policies in Philadelphia demonstrated that decision-
making tendencies identified in history can also be seen today; however, they are not the 
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only force influencing decision-making. Only in the case of zoning did decision-making 
habits play a dominant role; in the case of the ten-year tax abatement programs, both 
underlying assumptions and external limitations such as the need to generate revenue 
challenged policy change. Policies and programs that support maintenance are primarily 
shaped by constraints like lack of staff and funds.  
 These case-studies illustrate that overcoming assumptions is likely not sufficient 
to foster real policy change, at least not in the case of policies influencing development. 
Such changes will require the city to overcome external constraints. To focus the tax 
abatements exclusively on rehabilitation and areas of the city that need investment would 
decrease tax revenue, and policy-makers would need to find another source of funding. 
To increase L&I’s preventative maintenance monitoring and provide enough 
maintenance funding to meet need, especially for landlords, would require an enormous 
new outlay of city funds. These actions may not be feasible even if policy-makers have 
the will to pursue them.   
 However, though underlying assumptions may not be dominant in shaping policy, 
they do form an obstacle to policy change and should not be ignored. The assumptions 
that the city must rely on private development to meet various needs, that the government 
should support rather than hinder private development, that policy must cater to 
homeowners, and that revenue and cost-effectiveness should be policy priorities all shape 
contemporary policy. Leaders defend the tax abatement in its current form and 
permissive zoning because they believe that making private development easier is 
essential to the city’s success. This assumption can be seen at several points in 
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Philadelphia’s history. Similarly, policy-makers protect single-family zoning against 
proposals to allow subdivision into smaller, affordable units because this issue is opposed 
by homeowners, and there is a tendency to prioritize homeowners in decision-making 
dating to the 1950s.   
 The release of the Kenney Administration’s housing plan marks a point at which 
Philadelphia policy-makers may be starting to consider changes to the trajectory of 
housing policy. However, underlying assumptions can contribute to policy inertia which 
may make changes difficult to achieve; long-standing tendencies can be difficult to 
overcome. To create an environment in which changes can occur, particularly those that 
can make rehabilitation more feasible and attractive to developers, policy-makers will 
need to grapple with the underlying obstacles created by decision-making tendencies as 
well as the more concrete obstacles of funding and capacity.  
 More research will be needed to conclude whether underlying assumptions play a 
role in Philadelphia policy beyond housing and whether decision-making tendencies have 
a similar influence in other cities. However, this research opens a door to understanding 
the hidden role that decision-making habits rooted in history can play in shaping policy, 
and understanding and overcoming this phenomenon may allow policy-makers to get one 
step closer to making necessary changes a reality.  
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